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Representational Content and the Objects of Thought

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Representational Content and the Objects of Thought/ by Nicholas Rimell.
Author:	Rimell, Nicholas.
Description:	XIII, 215 p. 2 illus.online resource. :
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
Subject:	Philosophy of mind. -
Online resource:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3517-5
ISBN:	9789811635175

Representational Content and the Objects of Thought
Rimell, Nicholas.

Representational Content and the Objects of Thought[electronic resource] /by Nicholas Rimell. - 1st ed. 2021. - XIII, 215 p. 2 illus.online resource.

Introduction -- Narrow Representational Content -- Narrow Content and Propositions -- Private Propositions -- Why We Cannot Think about Nonexistents -- Against Necessary Existence -- Conclusion.

It is commonly held that our beliefs are attitudes towards propositions, and that a belief’s truth value (true or false) depends on the truth value of the proposition toward which it is an attitude. From this plausible view Rimell builds a theory of mental representation with two striking features. First, our “I” beliefs have private content—content that only a single subject can entertain. Second, it is impossible to think about nonexistents (e.g., Santa Claus, the fountain of youth). In light of the latter claim, Rimell offers an error theory meant to explain what we are doing when we think we’re thinking about nonexistents. To non-specialists, this book serves as a clear, careful introduction to central questions at the intersection of metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of mind: Are thought and meaning entirely in the head? What’s special about first-personal thought and speech? How (if at all) can we think about nonexistents, given that prima facie thinking involves a relation between a subject and an object of thought? To specialists, this book is designed to challenge the standard ways of thinking about these questions and to offer a unified response to them.

ISBN: 9789811635175

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-981-16-3517-5doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

555804
Philosophy of mind.

LC Class. No.: B53

Dewey Class. No.: 128.2

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