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Democracy in divided societies : = electoral engineering for conflict management /

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Democracy in divided societies :/ Benjamin Reilly.
Reminder of title:	electoral engineering for conflict management /
Author:	Reilly, Ben,
Description:	1 online resource (xiii, 217 pages) :digital, PDF file(s). :
Notes:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
Subject:	Elections - Case studies. -
Online resource:	https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491108
ISBN:	9780511491108 (ebook)

Democracy in divided societies : = electoral engineering for conflict management /
Reilly, Ben,

Democracy in divided societies :electoral engineering for conflict management /Benjamin Reilly. - 1 online resource (xiii, 217 pages) :digital, PDF file(s). - Theories of institutional design. - Theories of institutional design..

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Introduction: democracy in divided societies -- The historical development of preferential voting -- Centripetal incentives and political engineering in Australia -- The rise and fall of centripetalism in Papua New Guinea -- Electoral engineering and conflict management in divided societies 1: Fiji and Sri Lanka compared -- Electoral engineering and conflict management in divided societies 2: Northern Ireland, Estonia and beyond -- Technical variations and the theory of preference voting -- Conclusion: assessing the evidence.

Democracy is inherently difficult in societies divided along deep ethnic cleavages. Elections in such societies will often encourage 'centrifugal' politics which reward extremist ethnic appeals, zero-sum political behaviour and ethnic conflict, and which consequently often lead to the breakdown of democracy. Reilly examines the potential of 'electoral engineering' as a mechanism of conflict management in divided societies. He focuses on the little-known experience of a number of divided societies which have used preferential, vote-pooling electoral systems - such as Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland and Fiji. Examination of these cases shows that electoral systems which encourage bargaining between rival political actors, which promote the development of broad-based, aggregative political parties and which present campaigning politicians with incentives to attract votes from a range of ethnic groups can, under certain conditions, encourage the development of moderate, accommodatory political competition in divided societies.

ISBN: 9780511491108 (ebook)Subjects--Topical Terms:

800489
Elections
--Case studies.

LC Class. No.: JF1001 / .R39 2001

Dewey Class. No.: 324.6/3

Democracy in divided societies : = electoral engineering for conflict management /
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505 0 $a Introduction: democracy in divided societies -- The historical development of preferential voting -- Centripetal incentives and political engineering in Australia -- The rise and fall of centripetalism in Papua New Guinea -- Electoral engineering and conflict management in divided societies 1: Fiji and Sri Lanka compared -- Electoral engineering and conflict management in divided societies 2: Northern Ireland, Estonia and beyond -- Technical variations and the theory of preference voting -- Conclusion: assessing the evidence.
520 $a Democracy is inherently difficult in societies divided along deep ethnic cleavages. Elections in such societies will often encourage 'centrifugal' politics which reward extremist ethnic appeals, zero-sum political behaviour and ethnic conflict, and which consequently often lead to the breakdown of democracy. Reilly examines the potential of 'electoral engineering' as a mechanism of conflict management in divided societies. He focuses on the little-known experience of a number of divided societies which have used preferential, vote-pooling electoral systems - such as Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland and Fiji. Examination of these cases shows that electoral systems which encourage bargaining between rival political actors, which promote the development of broad-based, aggregative political parties and which present campaigning politicians with incentives to attract votes from a range of ethnic groups can, under certain conditions, encourage the development of moderate, accommodatory political competition in divided societies.
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