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Low-Yield Nuclear Parity in Great Power Competition.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Low-Yield Nuclear Parity in Great Power Competition./
Author:	Sisson, Thane.
Description:	1 online resource (135 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-12, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International84-12A.
Subject:	Political science. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798379593254

Low-Yield Nuclear Parity in Great Power Competition.
Sisson, Thane.

Low-Yield Nuclear Parity in Great Power Competition. - 1 online resource (135 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-12, Section: A.

Thesis (D.S.S.)--National American University, 2023.

Includes bibliographical references

This research analyzed, through three case studies, the impact of a parity gap in low-yield nuclear weapons on Great Power Competition (GPC). The first case study examined the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and Presidential Nuclear Initiative (PNI) decision, the second on the Russian/Ukraine invasion coercion, and the third on future Chinese advantages regarding low-yield nuclear weapons. The conclusion is that Russia and China threaten the United States' (U.S.) deterrence. The disparity of low-yield nuclear weapons, due to past decisions to divest the system, change operational posture, and adopt arm control policies provides an opportunity for Russia and China to shape responses by the U.S. and its allies. The researcher identifies four disadvantages for the U.S.: proportionality/credibility, capability, regional conflict, and arms control leverage. The dissertation concludes with five recommendations for policymakers: 1. If it is to present a credible deterrent, the U.S. must link arms control decisions with operational requirements to ensure a credible deterrent 2. The U.S. should operationally fill the deterrence gap with existing physics packages from offensive warheads 3. The U.S. should openly wargame with low-yield nuclear weapons4. The U.S. must build an integrated requirements-driven 2035 deterrence strategy 5. or, if U.S. policymakers reject the implementation of other recommendations, the U.S. must shift to more costly multi-domain defensive deterrence systems.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798379593254Subjects--Topical Terms:

558774
Political science.
Subjects--Index Terms:

ChinaIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Low-Yield Nuclear Parity in Great Power Competition.
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500 $a Advisor: Greaves, Denise.
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520 $a This research analyzed, through three case studies, the impact of a parity gap in low-yield nuclear weapons on Great Power Competition (GPC). The first case study examined the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and Presidential Nuclear Initiative (PNI) decision, the second on the Russian/Ukraine invasion coercion, and the third on future Chinese advantages regarding low-yield nuclear weapons. The conclusion is that Russia and China threaten the United States' (U.S.) deterrence. The disparity of low-yield nuclear weapons, due to past decisions to divest the system, change operational posture, and adopt arm control policies provides an opportunity for Russia and China to shape responses by the U.S. and its allies. The researcher identifies four disadvantages for the U.S.: proportionality/credibility, capability, regional conflict, and arms control leverage. The dissertation concludes with five recommendations for policymakers: 1. If it is to present a credible deterrent, the U.S. must link arms control decisions with operational requirements to ensure a credible deterrent 2. The U.S. should operationally fill the deterrence gap with existing physics packages from offensive warheads 3. The U.S. should openly wargame with low-yield nuclear weapons4. The U.S. must build an integrated requirements-driven 2035 deterrence strategy 5. or, if U.S. policymakers reject the implementation of other recommendations, the U.S. must shift to more costly multi-domain defensive deterrence systems.
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653 $a Nuclear parity
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653 $a Tactical nuclear weapons
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