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'And Yet It Moves' : = The Physics, Metaphysics, and Phenomenology of Time's Passage.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	'And Yet It Moves' :/
Reminder of title:	The Physics, Metaphysics, and Phenomenology of Time's Passage.
Author:	Rogers, Emily Jane.
Description:	1 online resource (187 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-01, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International86-01A.
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798383188637

'And Yet It Moves' : = The Physics, Metaphysics, and Phenomenology of Time's Passage.
Rogers, Emily Jane.

'And Yet It Moves' :The Physics, Metaphysics, and Phenomenology of Time's Passage. - 1 online resource (187 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-01, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Iowa, 2024.

Includes bibliographical references

The aim of this dissertation is to convince you that time passes. It is commonly held that a belief in time's passage is in conflict with relativistic physics and that our phenomenology as of passage is not sufficient reason for us to believe in it. I argue that both of these views are false. Along the way I offer a typology and critique of the existing accounts of passage. I offer my own view of passage, the process view, which requires that we be relationalists about time. I make the case that there is strong reason to endorse relationalism.In Chapter 1, I outline the most common positions in temporal ontology (presentism, eternalism, growing block theory, and the moving spotlight view), which are each committed to two theses: an ontological thesis about what exists, and a second thesis about whether the world is static or dynamic. I argue that the ontological theses are either trivial, not meaningful, or beg the question. I then try to recast the ontological theses in terms of truthmaking, which I argue also fails to generate a substantive dispute. I ultimately argue that the best way to salvage the debate over temporal ontology is to understand it as a debate about the second theses, that is, about whether or not time passes.In Chapter 2, I turn to trying to spell out what temporal passage is supposed to be. I give a typology of the existing accounts of passage in the literature, and give some critique of each. I then try to offer my own account of what passage is: passage is to be identified with change, which is to be understood, not as the standard 'at-at change', but in terms of a primitive which I call process. Finally, I note that my account of passage requires relationalism to get off the ground.In Chapter 3, I ask whether we should be substantivalists or relationalists about time, independent of our views on passage. I begin with an overview of the historical debate, focusing heavily on Newton, Leibniz, and the 20th century turn to considering "spacetime" as one entity (rather than treating space and time as two separate entities). I give an overview of the ways in which substantivalism and relationalism are characterized in contemporary debate, and show that it is more difficult than it seems at first pass to parse out what substantivalism is supposed to be. I offer three plausible versions of substantivalism, and characterize relationalism as the denial of all three. I then provide a critical discussion of five major arguments for or against substantivalism, and conclude that there is strong reason to accept relationalism.In Chapter 4, I turn to the question of whether or not we should take our phenomenology as of passage seriously. The dynamic theorist demands an error theory from the static theorist: how is it that we experience temporal passage if there is no such thing? The most common static theorist response to the demand is to say that our experiences as of passage should be considered illusory, either as a cognitive-perceptual illusion akin to illusions of apparent motion, or as a consequence of our (false) view of ourselves as enduring selves against a changing background. I show that these accounts fail because they end up presupposing dynamicity in their quest to show that reality is static, because illusions require dynamicity to get off the ground. I then turn to another common static theorist response to the demand, which is to argue that the phenomenal reality of passage cannot (or should not) tell us anything about the physical reality of passage. One version of this move appeals to the absence of temporal passage in the formulations of the laws of physics; I show that this reasoning relies on an incorrect identification of passage with a privileged property of presentness. Another version argues that because our phenomenology is notoriously subject to a variety of interfering conditions, it is unreliable as a basis for theorizing. I respond that we do not require complete reliability from our evidence in order to use it to build a view, either in science or in philosophy. I conclude that we must take our phenomenology seriously after all, and that it gives us good reason for thinking that temporal passage is a real feature of the world.In Chapter 5, I summarize the work I have done and try to tie up some loose ends by exploring consequences for ontology in light of the process view. I finish with a discussion of what we should do when science and philosophy seem to conflict.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798383188637Subjects--Topical Terms:

559771
Philosophy.
Subjects--Index Terms:

PassageIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

'And Yet It Moves' : = The Physics, Metaphysics, and Phenomenology of Time's Passage.
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