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Shareholder Rights and Non-Price Loa...

University of Lethbridge (Canada).

Shareholder Rights and Non-Price Loan Contract Terms.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Shareholder Rights and Non-Price Loan Contract Terms./
Author:	Han, Yunhui.
Description:	1 online resource (49 pages)
Notes:	Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 57-02.
Contained By:	Masters Abstracts International57-02(E).
Subject:	Banking. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780355395853

Shareholder Rights and Non-Price Loan Contract Terms.
Han, Yunhui.

Shareholder Rights and Non-Price Loan Contract Terms. - 1 online resource (49 pages)

Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 57-02.

Thesis (M.Sc.)--University of Lethbridge (Canada), 2017.

Includes bibliographical references

This thesis analyzes the impact of shareholder rights on non-price loan contract terms. Using a large sample of syndicated loans borrowed by U.S. firms between 1991 and 2006, I find that stronger shareholder rights significantly enhance the stringency of loan contract design. The likelihood of having collateral significantly increases with the strength of shareholder rights. Loan maturity of firms with strongest shareholder rights is 13.1% shorter. The loan size of the same borrowing firms is 8.4% smaller. These results are robust to different proxies of shareholder rights and are robust to the instrumental variable approach controlling for simultaneous determination of loan contract terms, such as collateral and maturity. This study complements the existing literature on the impact of shareholder rights on loan pricing and has important implications for understanding the impact of companies' governance structure on loan contract design.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780355395853Subjects--Topical Terms:

810653
Banking.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Shareholder Rights and Non-Price Loan Contract Terms.
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035 $a AAI10636067
040 $a MiAaPQ $b eng $c MiAaPQ $d NTU
100 1 $a Han, Yunhui. $3 1194215
245 1 0 $a Shareholder Rights and Non-Price Loan Contract Terms.
264 0 $c 2017
300 $a 1 online resource (49 pages)
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
500 $a Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 57-02.
500 $a Adviser: Pei Shao.
502 $a Thesis (M.Sc.)--University of Lethbridge (Canada), 2017.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a This thesis analyzes the impact of shareholder rights on non-price loan contract terms. Using a large sample of syndicated loans borrowed by U.S. firms between 1991 and 2006, I find that stronger shareholder rights significantly enhance the stringency of loan contract design. The likelihood of having collateral significantly increases with the strength of shareholder rights. Loan maturity of firms with strongest shareholder rights is 13.1% shorter. The loan size of the same borrowing firms is 8.4% smaller. These results are robust to different proxies of shareholder rights and are robust to the instrumental variable approach controlling for simultaneous determination of loan contract terms, such as collateral and maturity. This study complements the existing literature on the impact of shareholder rights on loan pricing and has important implications for understanding the impact of companies' governance structure on loan contract design.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Banking. $2 bicssc $3 810653
650 4 $a Finance. $3 559073
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0770
690 $a 0508
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a University of Lethbridge (Canada). $b Management. $3 1182399
773 0 $t Masters Abstracts International $g 57-02(E).
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10636067 $z click for full text (PQDT)

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