國立虎尾科技大學 |

Algorithmic Decision Theory = 7th International Conference, ADT 2021, Toulouse, France, November 3–5, 2021, Proceedings /

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Algorithmic Decision Theory/ edited by Dimitris Fotakis, David Ríos Insua.
Reminder of title:	7th International Conference, ADT 2021, Toulouse, France, November 3–5, 2021, Proceedings /
other author:	Fotakis, Dimitris.
Description:	XIX, 441 p. 32 illus.online resource. :
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
Subject:	Artificial intelligence. -
Online resource:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87756-9
ISBN:	9783030877569

Algorithmic Decision Theory = 7th International Conference, ADT 2021, Toulouse, France, November 3–5, 2021, Proceedings /
Algorithmic Decision Theory7th International Conference, ADT 2021, Toulouse, France, November 3–5, 2021, Proceedings /[electronic resource] :edited by Dimitris Fotakis, David Ríos Insua. - 1st ed. 2021. - XIX, 441 p. 32 illus.online resource. - Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence ;13023. - Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence ;9285.

Computational Social Choice and Preference Modelling -- Aggregating Preferences Represented by Conditional Preference Networks -- Measuring Nearly Single-peakedness of an Electorate: Some New Insights -- Preference Aggregation in the Generalised Unavailable Candidate Model -- Simultaneous Elicitation of Scoring Rule and Agent Preferences for Robust Winner Determination -- Preference Elicitation -- Incremental elicitation of preferences: optimist or pessimist? -- Probabilistic Lexicographic Preference Trees -- Incremental Preference Elicitation with Bipolar Choquet Integrals -- Preference Aggregation and Voting -- In the Beginning There Were n Agents: Founding and Amending a Constitution -- Unveiling the Truth in Liquid Democracy with Misinformed Voters -- Computing Kemeny Rankings From d-Euclidean Preferences -- Iterative Deliberation via Metric Aggregation.-Manipulation in Voting -- Obvious Manipulability of Voting Rules -- Manipulation in Communication Structures of Graph-Restricted Weighted Voting Games -- Strategic Voting in Negotiating Teams -- The Nonmanipulative Vote-Deficits of Voting Rules -- Fair Division and Resource Allocation -- Allocating Indivisible Items with Minimum Dissatisfaction on Preference Graphs -- On Fairness via Picking Sequences in Allocation of Indivisible Goods -- On Reachable Assignments in Cycles -- Minimizing and balancing envy among agents using Ordered Weighted Average -- Algorithmic Decision Theory -- Interactive Optimization of Submodular Functions under Matroid Constraints -- Necessary and possible interaction in a 2-maxitive Sugeno integral model -- Coalition Formation -- Democratic Forking: Choosing Sides with Social Choice -- Hedonic Diversity Games Revisited -- Stable Matchings -- Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning for Decentralized Stable Matching -- Lazy Gale-Shapley for Many-to-One Matching with Partial Information -- Participatory Budgeting -- Participatory Funding Coordination: Model, Axioms and Rules -- Complexity of Manipulative Interference in Participatory Budgeting. .

This book constitutes the conference proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory, ADT 2021, held in Toulouse, France, in November 2021. The 27 full papers presented were carefully selected from 58 submissions. The papers focus on algorithmic decision theory broadly defined, seeking to bring together researchers and practitioners coming from diverse areas of computer science, economics and operations research in order to improve the theory and practice of modern decision support.

ISBN: 9783030877569

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-030-87756-9doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

559380
Artificial intelligence.

LC Class. No.: Q334-342

Dewey Class. No.: 006.3

Algorithmic Decision Theory = 7th International Conference, ADT 2021, Toulouse, France, November 3–5, 2021, Proceedings /
LDR:04031nam a22004095i 4500 001 1056658
003 DE-He213
005 20211006103757.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 220103s2021 sz | s |||| 0|eng d
020 $a 9783030877569 $9 978-3-030-87756-9
024 7 $a 10.1007/978-3-030-87756-9 $2 doi
035 $a 978-3-030-87756-9
050 4 $a Q334-342
072 7 $a UYQ $2 bicssc
072 7 $a COM004000 $2 bisacsh
072 7 $a UYQ $2 thema
082 0 4 $a 006.3 $2 23
245 1 0 $a Algorithmic Decision Theory $h [electronic resource] : $b 7th International Conference, ADT 2021, Toulouse, France, November 3–5, 2021, Proceedings / $c edited by Dimitris Fotakis, David Ríos Insua.
250 $a 1st ed. 2021.
264 1 $a Cham : $b Springer International Publishing : $b Imprint: Springer, $c 2021.
300 $a XIX, 441 p. 32 illus. $b online resource.
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
347 $a text file $b PDF $2 rda
490 1 $a Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence ; $v 13023
505 0 $a Computational Social Choice and Preference Modelling -- Aggregating Preferences Represented by Conditional Preference Networks -- Measuring Nearly Single-peakedness of an Electorate: Some New Insights -- Preference Aggregation in the Generalised Unavailable Candidate Model -- Simultaneous Elicitation of Scoring Rule and Agent Preferences for Robust Winner Determination -- Preference Elicitation -- Incremental elicitation of preferences: optimist or pessimist? -- Probabilistic Lexicographic Preference Trees -- Incremental Preference Elicitation with Bipolar Choquet Integrals -- Preference Aggregation and Voting -- In the Beginning There Were n Agents: Founding and Amending a Constitution -- Unveiling the Truth in Liquid Democracy with Misinformed Voters -- Computing Kemeny Rankings From d-Euclidean Preferences -- Iterative Deliberation via Metric Aggregation.-Manipulation in Voting -- Obvious Manipulability of Voting Rules -- Manipulation in Communication Structures of Graph-Restricted Weighted Voting Games -- Strategic Voting in Negotiating Teams -- The Nonmanipulative Vote-Deficits of Voting Rules -- Fair Division and Resource Allocation -- Allocating Indivisible Items with Minimum Dissatisfaction on Preference Graphs -- On Fairness via Picking Sequences in Allocation of Indivisible Goods -- On Reachable Assignments in Cycles -- Minimizing and balancing envy among agents using Ordered Weighted Average -- Algorithmic Decision Theory -- Interactive Optimization of Submodular Functions under Matroid Constraints -- Necessary and possible interaction in a 2-maxitive Sugeno integral model -- Coalition Formation -- Democratic Forking: Choosing Sides with Social Choice -- Hedonic Diversity Games Revisited -- Stable Matchings -- Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning for Decentralized Stable Matching -- Lazy Gale-Shapley for Many-to-One Matching with Partial Information -- Participatory Budgeting -- Participatory Funding Coordination: Model, Axioms and Rules -- Complexity of Manipulative Interference in Participatory Budgeting. .
520 $a This book constitutes the conference proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory, ADT 2021, held in Toulouse, France, in November 2021. The 27 full papers presented were carefully selected from 58 submissions. The papers focus on algorithmic decision theory broadly defined, seeking to bring together researchers and practitioners coming from diverse areas of computer science, economics and operations research in order to improve the theory and practice of modern decision support.
650 0 $a Artificial intelligence. $3 559380
650 0 $a Computers. $3 565115
650 0 $a Computer science—Mathematics. $3 1253519
650 1 4 $a Artificial Intelligence. $3 646849
650 2 4 $a Information Systems and Communication Service. $3 669203
650 2 4 $a Mathematics of Computing. $3 669457
700 1 $a Fotakis, Dimitris. $4 edt $4 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt $3 1141161
700 1 $a Ríos Insua, David. $e editor. $1 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5748-9658 $4 edt $4 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt $3 1362013
710 2 $a SpringerLink (Online service) $3 593884
773 0 $t Springer Nature eBook
776 0 8 $i Printed edition: $z 9783030877552
776 0 8 $i Printed edition: $z 9783030877576
830 0 $a Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence ; $v 9285 $3 1253845
856 4 0 $u https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87756-9
912 $a ZDB-2-SCS
912 $a ZDB-2-SXCS
912 $a ZDB-2-LNC
950 $a Computer Science (SpringerNature-11645)
950 $a Computer Science (R0) (SpringerNature-43710)