國立虎尾科技大學 |

Essays on the structure of financial markets.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays on the structure of financial markets./
Author:	Yosha, Oved.
Description:	1 online resource (141 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 54-03, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International54-03A.
Subject:	Finance. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798643111061

Essays on the structure of financial markets.
Yosha, Oved.

Essays on the structure of financial markets. - 1 online resource (141 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 54-03, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 1992.

Includes bibliographical references

Chapter I. Adverse selection in an insurance market may result in low-risk individuals remaining uncovered. In the framework of a monopolistic insurance market with private information, it is shown that government entry to the market as a competitor which sells insurance, results in all potential buyers actually purchasing insurance. Chapter II. The welfare trade off between reduction in risk and enhanced market power, as depository institutions become larger but fewer, is studied. The main result is that when there are enough independent risks in the economy, it is possible to achieve high diversification through mergers between depository institutions at a very small cost in terms of greater market power. Chapter III. Firms wishing to issue securities on the stock market are required to disclose private information which might be beneficial to competitors. Issuing securities publicly is more costly than doing so privately. In equilibrium, firms with sensitive information issue securities privately, while competitors cannot unambiguously infer that the information withheld is very sensitive. This suggests that one special role of banks and venture capital in financial markets, is to provide debt and equity financing, respectively, confidentially. Chapter IV. A decentralized market with pairwise meetings of agents is studied. There is a one sided information asymmetry regarding the state of the world, which may be "low" or "high." The set of equilibria of the model is characterized, and its behavior is studied as the market becomes approximately frictionless. For any one sided information economy there is an equilibrium where trade occurs at the right price (an ex-post individually rational price). Moreover, there is an open set of economies where in all the equilibria trade occurs at the right price.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798643111061Subjects--Topical Terms:

559073
Finance.
Subjects--Index Terms:

depository institutionsIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Essays on the structure of financial markets.
LDR:03090ntm a22003617 4500 001 1148957
005 20240930105304.5
006 m o d
007 cr bn ---uuuuu
008 250605s1992 xx obm 000 0 eng d
020 $a 9798643111061
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI9228312
035 $a AAI9228312
040 $a MiAaPQ $b eng $c MiAaPQ $d NTU
100 1 $a Yosha, Oved. $3 1475055
245 1 0 $a Essays on the structure of financial markets.
264 0 $c 1992
300 $a 1 online resource (141 pages)
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 54-03, Section: A.
500 $a Publisher info.: Dissertation/Thesis.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 1992.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a Chapter I. Adverse selection in an insurance market may result in low-risk individuals remaining uncovered. In the framework of a monopolistic insurance market with private information, it is shown that government entry to the market as a competitor which sells insurance, results in all potential buyers actually purchasing insurance. Chapter II. The welfare trade off between reduction in risk and enhanced market power, as depository institutions become larger but fewer, is studied. The main result is that when there are enough independent risks in the economy, it is possible to achieve high diversification through mergers between depository institutions at a very small cost in terms of greater market power. Chapter III. Firms wishing to issue securities on the stock market are required to disclose private information which might be beneficial to competitors. Issuing securities publicly is more costly than doing so privately. In equilibrium, firms with sensitive information issue securities privately, while competitors cannot unambiguously infer that the information withheld is very sensitive. This suggests that one special role of banks and venture capital in financial markets, is to provide debt and equity financing, respectively, confidentially. Chapter IV. A decentralized market with pairwise meetings of agents is studied. There is a one sided information asymmetry regarding the state of the world, which may be "low" or "high." The set of equilibria of the model is characterized, and its behavior is studied as the market becomes approximately frictionless. For any one sided information economy there is an equilibrium where trade occurs at the right price (an ex-post individually rational price). Moreover, there is an open set of economies where in all the equilibria trade occurs at the right price.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2024
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Finance. $3 559073
653 $a depository institutions
653 $a insurance
653 $a stock market
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0511
690 $a 0508
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a Harvard University. $3 1180437
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 54-03A.
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9228312 $z click for full text (PQDT)