國立虎尾科技大學 |

Vulture capitalists or virtue capitalists? Examining the effects of venture capitalist involvement on the use of equity incentives and firm performance in initial public offering firms.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Vulture capitalists or virtue capitalists? Examining the effects of venture capitalist involvement on the use of equity incentives and firm performance in initial public offering firms./
Author:	Cyr, Linda Ann.
Description:	1 online resource (130 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 60-04, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International60-04A.
Subject:	Finance. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780591924190

Vulture capitalists or virtue capitalists? Examining the effects of venture capitalist involvement on the use of equity incentives and firm performance in initial public offering firms.
Cyr, Linda Ann.

Vulture capitalists or virtue capitalists? Examining the effects of venture capitalist involvement on the use of equity incentives and firm performance in initial public offering firms. - 1 online resource (130 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 60-04, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Cornell University, 1998.

Includes bibliographical references

Although venture capitalists (VCs) are often maligned as vultures who 'steal' large portions of entrepreneurs' companies in exchange for much needed cash, a review of the venture capital literature reveals that VCs provide essential 'value added' to their portfolio firms. Among the most critical resources that VCs offer in addition to financing are acting as a sounding board for management, providing links to the financial community, and sharing their business acumen. Venture capitalists bring with them myriad experiences of success and failure, and the nature of their relationships with their portfolio companies positions them to share the lessons of those experiences. To date, investigations of this 'value added' have focused on the relationship between the venture capitalist and the top management team of the portfolio firm. In this dissertation, I argue that venture capitalists might add value by influencing the portfolio firm's use of equity incentives for all employees. Specifically, I rely on the venture capital literature (e.g. Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; Sapienza, 1992), the finance literature related to the effects of venture capitalist involvement in initial public offering firms (e.g. Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, & Vetsuypens, 1990; Megginson & Weiss, 1991), and the agency-based compensation literature (e.g. Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Stiglitz, 1975) to develop hypotheses regarding the effects of venture capitalist involvement and the use of equity incentives for all employees on performance of initial public offering firms. Analyses of data from a sample of 402 firms that went public in 1993 provide support for the hypothesis that venture capitalists positively influence the likelihood that the portfolio firm will offer equity incentives (i.e. incentive stock options and stock purchase plans) to all employees. Furthermore, consistent with the agency theory argument that monitoring and incentives can behave as complements to one another, venture capitalist involvement and equity incentives for all employees operate in concert to have a positive effect on stock price performance three years after the initial public offering.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780591924190Subjects--Topical Terms:

559073
Finance.
Subjects--Index Terms:

CapitalistsIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Vulture capitalists or virtue capitalists? Examining the effects of venture capitalist involvement on the use of equity incentives and firm performance in initial public offering firms.
LDR:03679ntm a22003977 4500 001 1148962
005 20240930105305.5
006 m o d
007 cr bn ---uuuuu
008 250605s1998 xx obm 000 0 eng d
020 $a 9780591924190
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI9838770
035 $a AAI9838770
040 $a MiAaPQ $b eng $c MiAaPQ $d NTU
100 1 $a Cyr, Linda Ann. $3 1475061
245 1 0 $a Vulture capitalists or virtue capitalists? Examining the effects of venture capitalist involvement on the use of equity incentives and firm performance in initial public offering firms.
264 0 $c 1998
300 $a 1 online resource (130 pages)
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 60-04, Section: A.
500 $a Publisher info.: Dissertation/Thesis.
500 $a Advisor: Wellbourne, Theresa M.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Cornell University, 1998.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a Although venture capitalists (VCs) are often maligned as vultures who 'steal' large portions of entrepreneurs' companies in exchange for much needed cash, a review of the venture capital literature reveals that VCs provide essential 'value added' to their portfolio firms. Among the most critical resources that VCs offer in addition to financing are acting as a sounding board for management, providing links to the financial community, and sharing their business acumen. Venture capitalists bring with them myriad experiences of success and failure, and the nature of their relationships with their portfolio companies positions them to share the lessons of those experiences. To date, investigations of this 'value added' have focused on the relationship between the venture capitalist and the top management team of the portfolio firm. In this dissertation, I argue that venture capitalists might add value by influencing the portfolio firm's use of equity incentives for all employees. Specifically, I rely on the venture capital literature (e.g. Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; Sapienza, 1992), the finance literature related to the effects of venture capitalist involvement in initial public offering firms (e.g. Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, & Vetsuypens, 1990; Megginson & Weiss, 1991), and the agency-based compensation literature (e.g. Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Stiglitz, 1975) to develop hypotheses regarding the effects of venture capitalist involvement and the use of equity incentives for all employees on performance of initial public offering firms. Analyses of data from a sample of 402 firms that went public in 1993 provide support for the hypothesis that venture capitalists positively influence the likelihood that the portfolio firm will offer equity incentives (i.e. incentive stock options and stock purchase plans) to all employees. Furthermore, consistent with the agency theory argument that monitoring and incentives can behave as complements to one another, venture capitalist involvement and equity incentives for all employees operate in concert to have a positive effect on stock price performance three years after the initial public offering.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2024
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Finance. $3 559073
653 $a Capitalists
653 $a Equity incentives
653 $a Firm performance
653 $a Initial public offering
653 $a Venture capitalist
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0454
690 $a 0508
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a Cornell University. $3 845492
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 60-04A.
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9838770 $z click for full text (PQDT)