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Essays in Experiments and Microeconomic Theory.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays in Experiments and Microeconomic Theory./
Author:	Yoo, Wonseok.
Description:	1 online resource (160 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International85-12A.
Subject:	International law. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798383161647

Essays in Experiments and Microeconomic Theory.
Yoo, Wonseok.

Essays in Experiments and Microeconomic Theory. - 1 online resource (160 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2024.

Includes bibliographical references

This dissertation investigates three key areas: 1) the processes by which individuals update their beliefs in the presence of behavioral biases and cognitive dissonance, 2) the engagement of individuals in group bargaining processes and the effects of these interactions on bargaining outcomes, and 3) the transmission of information through intermediaries. The first chapter delves into individuals' belief updating behaviors within the context of financial decision-making, revealing how individuals' beliefs are affected by their behavioral biases in asset choices through an experiment with varied treatments to understand belief updating. The second chapter, co-authored with Ravideep Sethi, investigates how group size, supermajority thresholds, and delegation impact allocation and within-group inequality in group bargaining. The final chapter shifts focus to the communication facilitation role of profit-seeking information intermediaries in scenarios where a sender lacks full commitment power, analyzing how different network features affect the communication rules and surplus distribution. Collectively, these chapters enrich our comprehension of how individuals update their beliefs, interact within and across groups, and navigate communication dynamics.The first chapter focuses on the interplay between behavioral biases and belief updating in the context of asset choice problems. It is observed that decision makers often exhibit behavioral biases leading to sub-optimal decisions. This study examines whether individuals distort their beliefs to justify their biased choices. Especially, I investigate the dynamics of belief updating in a setting where cognitive dissonance-a discomfort stemming from internal inconsistencies-could play a significant role, by designing an experiment with four treatments. The first treatment simply elicits beliefs. In the subsequent three treatments, subjects are endowed with one of two potential assets at random. Following this, they are asked to report their beliefs regarding their assigned asset after each signal. Subjects have the option to either "switch" or "keep" their initial asset, with associated costs that vary across the three latter treatments (zero, finite, or infinite). By manipulating switching costs, we effectively intensify subjective ownership towards the asset, fostering behavioral biases to create cognitive dissonance. Our findings indicate that subjects frequently make sub-optimal asset choice decisions when confronted with a finite transaction cost. Furthermore, they tend to distort their beliefs about their endowed asset, aligning their beliefs with their sub-optimal actions to mitigate cognitive dissonance.The second chapter, which was coauthored with Ravideep Sethi provides an insight in group bargaining, and its distributional effect. Two groups engaged in non-cooperative bargaining over a fixed surplus may differ in size and the super-majority threshold they employ for within-group ratification. A group may also delegate the ability to propose allocations to a subset of members. We find that total allocation to a group does not depend on group size and increases with the super-majority threshold. Within-group inequality is an increasing function of group size and decreases with the super-majority threshold. Finally, we find that delegation decreases the group's total allocation because non-delegates accept lower allocations. We consider the implications of our results on bilateral treaty negotiation.In the third chapter, I study how information intermediaries affect communication between a sender and a receiver. Profit seeking intermediaries which are not directly affected by interactions between the sender and the receiver play an important role in assisting communication between the two. In particular, I study a situation where a sender does not have a full commitment power. Then, a monopolistic intermediary without any commitment power would use a communication rule that achieves social maximum welfare in our baseline model. We also study extensions of the baseline model and find the equilibrium communication rule and the split of surplus depend on various features of the network: bargaining power, transferability, and the structure of competition. Especially, I find that in the sender-intermediary-receiver network structure, stronger bargaining power does not necessarily help.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798383161647Subjects--Topical Terms:

557047
International law.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Cognitive dissonanceIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Essays in Experiments and Microeconomic Theory.
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