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Essays on Dual-Class Structure and Corporate Governance : = Exploring the Impact on Firm Performance, Innovation, and Compensation.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays on Dual-Class Structure and Corporate Governance :/
Reminder of title:	Exploring the Impact on Firm Performance, Innovation, and Compensation.
Author:	Cheng, Hui-Heng.
Description:	1 online resource (107 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International85-12A.
Subject:	Finance. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798383124208

Essays on Dual-Class Structure and Corporate Governance : = Exploring the Impact on Firm Performance, Innovation, and Compensation.
Cheng, Hui-Heng.

Essays on Dual-Class Structure and Corporate Governance :Exploring the Impact on Firm Performance, Innovation, and Compensation. - 1 online resource (107 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Washington State University, 2024.

Includes bibliographical references

For the first chapter of this dissertation, I explore the impact of dual-class structure IPOs on firm performance and innovation in technology firms. We investigate board-related attributes' influence on firm value and innovation in such IPOs. A comprehensive analysis of technology firms' IPOs from 1994 to 2020 reveals that dual-class structure tech firms outperform their counterparts in two-year stock returns and firm value. These firms also exhibit greater investment in innovation and more patents granted. Dual-class technology firms typically feature smaller board sizes and fewer non-executive directors. Improved board independence positively affects firm value, while larger board sizes enhance patent quality, but increased board independence has adverse effects.In the second chapter, I investigate the nexus between dual-class structure and executive compensation, considering the role of agency problems and the moderating influence of executive ownership, voting power, and board characteristics post-Dodd-Frank Act. Utilizing data from the Execucomp dataset spanning 2011 to 2022, encompassing 2,519 firms, including 174 with dual-class structures, empirical analysis reveals a statistically significant negative association between dual-class structure and equity-based compensation, consistent with CEO control and turnover hypotheses. Despite mixed moderation effects, the overall impact of dual-class structure on executive compensation remains adverse, challenging prevailing agency problem assumptions. Furthermore, the study underscores a negative association between CEO-chair duality and executive compensation in dual-class firms, indicating minimal agency conflict. These findings address a significant research gap, offering insights into corporate governance dynamics, suggesting that agency issues may not significantly influence executive compensation within dual-class firms, instead potentially providing greater position security.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798383124208Subjects--Topical Terms:

559073
Finance.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Dual-class structureIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Essays on Dual-Class Structure and Corporate Governance : = Exploring the Impact on Firm Performance, Innovation, and Compensation.
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520 $a For the first chapter of this dissertation, I explore the impact of dual-class structure IPOs on firm performance and innovation in technology firms. We investigate board-related attributes' influence on firm value and innovation in such IPOs. A comprehensive analysis of technology firms' IPOs from 1994 to 2020 reveals that dual-class structure tech firms outperform their counterparts in two-year stock returns and firm value. These firms also exhibit greater investment in innovation and more patents granted. Dual-class technology firms typically feature smaller board sizes and fewer non-executive directors. Improved board independence positively affects firm value, while larger board sizes enhance patent quality, but increased board independence has adverse effects.In the second chapter, I investigate the nexus between dual-class structure and executive compensation, considering the role of agency problems and the moderating influence of executive ownership, voting power, and board characteristics post-Dodd-Frank Act. Utilizing data from the Execucomp dataset spanning 2011 to 2022, encompassing 2,519 firms, including 174 with dual-class structures, empirical analysis reveals a statistically significant negative association between dual-class structure and equity-based compensation, consistent with CEO control and turnover hypotheses. Despite mixed moderation effects, the overall impact of dual-class structure on executive compensation remains adverse, challenging prevailing agency problem assumptions. Furthermore, the study underscores a negative association between CEO-chair duality and executive compensation in dual-class firms, indicating minimal agency conflict. These findings address a significant research gap, offering insights into corporate governance dynamics, suggesting that agency issues may not significantly influence executive compensation within dual-class firms, instead potentially providing greater position security.
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