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The puzzle of perceptual justification = conscious experience, higher-order beliefs, and reliable processes /

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The puzzle of perceptual justification/ by Harmen Ghijsen.
Reminder of title:	conscious experience, higher-order beliefs, and reliable processes /
Author:	Ghijsen, Harmen.
Published:	Cham :Springer International Publishing : : 2016.,
Description:	xiii, 165 p. :digital ; : 24 cm.;
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30500-4
ISBN:	9783319305004

The puzzle of perceptual justification = conscious experience, higher-order beliefs, and reliable processes /
Ghijsen, Harmen.

The puzzle of perceptual justificationconscious experience, higher-order beliefs, and reliable processes /[electronic resource] :by Harmen Ghijsen. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2016. - xiii, 165 p. :digital ;24 cm. - Synthese library ;v.377. - Synthese library ;v.344..

Chapter 1. Perception, Hallucination and Justification -- Chapter 2. Evidentialism and the Problem of Fit -- Chapter 3. Dogmatism and the Distinctiveness Problem -- Chapter 4. Epistemological Disjunctivism and Higher-Order Issues -- Chapter 5. Process Reliabilism and Its Classic Problems -- Chapter 6. A Higher-Order Rejoinder for Reliabilism.

This book provides an accessible and up-to-date discussion of contemporary theories of perceptual justification that each highlight different factors related to perception, i.e., conscious experience, higher-order beliefs, and reliable processes. The book's discussion starts from the viewpoint that perception is not only one of our fundamental sources of knowledge and justification, but also plays this role for many less sophisticated animals. It proposes a scientifically informed reliabilist theory which can accommodate this fact without denying that some of our epistemic abilities as human perceivers are special. This allows it to combine many of our intuitions about the importance of conscious experience and higher-order belief with the controversial thesis that perceptual justification is fundamentally non-evidential in character.

ISBN: 9783319305004

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-319-30500-4doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

559771
Philosophy.

LC Class. No.: BD161 / .G455 2016

Dewey Class. No.: 121.34

The puzzle of perceptual justification = conscious experience, higher-order beliefs, and reliable processes /
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520 $a This book provides an accessible and up-to-date discussion of contemporary theories of perceptual justification that each highlight different factors related to perception, i.e., conscious experience, higher-order beliefs, and reliable processes. The book's discussion starts from the viewpoint that perception is not only one of our fundamental sources of knowledge and justification, but also plays this role for many less sophisticated animals. It proposes a scientifically informed reliabilist theory which can accommodate this fact without denying that some of our epistemic abilities as human perceivers are special. This allows it to combine many of our intuitions about the importance of conscious experience and higher-order belief with the controversial thesis that perceptual justification is fundamentally non-evidential in character.
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