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An empirical study of insider behaviors : = Affiliated insiders, and legislative and enforcement efforts.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	An empirical study of insider behaviors :/
Reminder of title:	Affiliated insiders, and legislative and enforcement efforts.
Author:	Bartholow, Janet L. H.
Description:	1 online resource (120 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-05(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International79-05A(E).
Subject:	Finance. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780355556629

An empirical study of insider behaviors : = Affiliated insiders, and legislative and enforcement efforts.
Bartholow, Janet L. H.

An empirical study of insider behaviors :Affiliated insiders, and legislative and enforcement efforts. - 1 online resource (120 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-05(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)

Includes bibliographical references

Affiliated Insiders are not corporate officers or directors; but they do have access to material information. Affiliated Insiders include investment advisors and general counsels, as well as persons who have a relationship with other insiders. The first part of my study divides insiders into Routine insiders and Opportunistic insiders consistent with Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2012). CMP find inconsistent trading to be "Opportunistic" and informative because they predict market returns and attain abnormal returns. I find Affiliated Insiders, both Routine and Opportunistic, do not inform the market when testing the predictive ability of their trades on one-month future buy and sell returns.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780355556629Subjects--Topical Terms:

559073
Finance.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

An empirical study of insider behaviors : = Affiliated insiders, and legislative and enforcement efforts.
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100 1 $a Bartholow, Janet L. H. $3 1181239
245 1 3 $a An empirical study of insider behaviors : $b Affiliated insiders, and legislative and enforcement efforts.
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300 $a 1 online resource (120 pages)
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-05(E), Section: A.
500 $a Advisers: John Thornton; Jayaram Muthuswamy.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.) $c Kent State University $d 2017.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a Affiliated Insiders are not corporate officers or directors; but they do have access to material information. Affiliated Insiders include investment advisors and general counsels, as well as persons who have a relationship with other insiders. The first part of my study divides insiders into Routine insiders and Opportunistic insiders consistent with Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2012). CMP find inconsistent trading to be "Opportunistic" and informative because they predict market returns and attain abnormal returns. I find Affiliated Insiders, both Routine and Opportunistic, do not inform the market when testing the predictive ability of their trades on one-month future buy and sell returns.
520 $a In a follow-up study, I create long-short portfolios for Routine and Opportunistic Affiliates on one-month and six-month future returns. Both CMP and Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser (2003) test corporate insiders' ability to achieve abnormal returns using the Capital Asset Pricing Model of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), the Fama and French Three-Factor Model (1993), and the Carhart Four-Factor Model (1997). I do not find abnormal returns for one-month portfolios. The short-swing rule disallows insiders to profit in any six-month time period so by testing on rolling six-month portfolios I do find Affiliates and the General Counsel subgroup trades produce abnormal annualized returns ranging from 15.2 to 21.2 percent.
520 $a In 2002, legislators passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to increase criminal fines and penalties for illegal insider trading. Since 2007, regulators at the SEC prioritized enforcement for illegal insider trading practices. The second part of my study focuses on the behavior of insiders following enhanced legislative and enforcement actions. Testing monthly aggregated trades for all insiders from 1992 to 2014, I find insiders change their behavior post legislative and enforcement actions. In the period following Sarbanes Oxley's enactment, insiders increase the value of their buy trade values relative to the firm's total monthly traded value by 5.3 percent and reduce their sell trade values proportionate to the firm's total monthly traded value by more than 37 percent. Similarly for post-SEC time periods and for both the number of shares traded and trade value, insiders increase buys and reduce sells following enforcement efforts.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Finance. $3 559073
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0508
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a Kent State University. $b Finance. $3 1181240
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 79-05A(E).
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10753479 $z click for full text (PQDT)