國立虎尾科技大學 |

Insider share-pledging and firm investors.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Insider share-pledging and firm investors./
Author:	Puleo, Michael R.
Description:	1 online resource (106 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-10(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International77-10A(E).
Subject:	Finance. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9781339755960

Insider share-pledging and firm investors.
Puleo, Michael R.

Insider share-pledging and firm investors. - 1 online resource (106 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-10(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)

Includes bibliographical references

This item is not available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.

Corporate insiders frequently borrow from lending institutions and pledge personal equity shares as collateral for the loan. Using manually collected pledge data for January 2007-December 2011, I examine how this phenomena affects firm investors and analyze agency conflicts between pledging managers and (a) outside shareholders, and (b) bondholders. Pledging potentially influences investor risk through changing managerial incentives and/or contingency risk from ill-timed margin calls. Findings suggest influential insiders extract private benefits of control at the expense of outside shareholders through pledging. Difference-in-differences regressions utilizing an exogenous shock to lending supply indicate pledging corresponds with a 9.9% relative increase in stock volatility -- controlling for changes in fundamentals -- and support a causal interpretation of the relation between pledging and equity risk. Despite apparently harming equity investors however, further analysis suggests pledging benefits bondholders, and corresponds with an economically and statistically significant reduction in yield spreads on corporate bonds. Robustness tests evidence reductions in risky financing when insiders pledge, corroborating the negative relation between pledging and cost of debt and consistent with mitigated agency conflicts between managers and bondholders.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9781339755960Subjects--Topical Terms:

559073
Finance.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Insider share-pledging and firm investors.
LDR:02703ntm a2200361Ki 4500 001 910864
005 20180517120323.5
006 m o u
007 cr mn||||a|a||
008 190606s2016 xx obm 000 0 eng d
020 $a 9781339755960
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI10112442
035 $a (MiAaPQ)temple:12505
035 $a AAI10112442
040 $a MiAaPQ $b eng $c MiAaPQ
099 $a TUL $f hyy $c available through World Wide Web
100 1 $a Puleo, Michael R. $3 1182351
245 1 0 $a Insider share-pledging and firm investors.
264 0 $c 2016
300 $a 1 online resource (106 pages)
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-10(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Ronald C. Anderson.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.) $c Temple University $d 2016.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
506 $a This item is not available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.
520 $a Corporate insiders frequently borrow from lending institutions and pledge personal equity shares as collateral for the loan. Using manually collected pledge data for January 2007-December 2011, I examine how this phenomena affects firm investors and analyze agency conflicts between pledging managers and (a) outside shareholders, and (b) bondholders. Pledging potentially influences investor risk through changing managerial incentives and/or contingency risk from ill-timed margin calls. Findings suggest influential insiders extract private benefits of control at the expense of outside shareholders through pledging. Difference-in-differences regressions utilizing an exogenous shock to lending supply indicate pledging corresponds with a 9.9% relative increase in stock volatility -- controlling for changes in fundamentals -- and support a causal interpretation of the relation between pledging and equity risk. Despite apparently harming equity investors however, further analysis suggests pledging benefits bondholders, and corresponds with an economically and statistically significant reduction in yield spreads on corporate bonds. Robustness tests evidence reductions in risky financing when insiders pledge, corroborating the negative relation between pledging and cost of debt and consistent with mitigated agency conflicts between managers and bondholders.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Finance. $3 559073
650 4 $a Economics. $3 555568
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0508
690 $a 0501
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a Temple University. $b Business Administration/Finance. $3 1182352
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 77-10A(E).
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10112442 $z click for full text (PQDT)