國立虎尾科技大學 |

Essays on Social Norms.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays on Social Norms./
Author:	Janetos, Nicholas.
Description:	1 online resource (160 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-12(E), Section: A.
Subject:	Economics. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780355095272

Essays on Social Norms.
Janetos, Nicholas.

Essays on Social Norms. - 1 online resource (160 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-12(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 2017.

Includes bibliographical references

I study equilibrium behavior in games for which players have some preference for appearing to be well-informed. In chapter one, I study the effect of such preferences in a dynamic game where players have preferences for appearing to be well-informed about the actions of past players. I find that such games display cyclical behavior, which I interpret as a model of `fads'. I show that the speed of the fads is driven by the information available to less well-informed players. In chapter two, I study the effect of such preferences in a static game of voting with many players. Prior work studies voting games in which player's preferences are determined only by some disutility of voting, as well as some concern for swaying the outcome of the election to one's favored candidate. This literature finds that, in equilibrium, a vanishingly small percentage of the population votes, since the chance of swaying the election disappears as more players vote, while the cost of voting remains high for all. I introduce uncertainty about the quality of the candidates, as well as a preference for appearing to be well-informed about the candidates. I find that high levels of voter turnout are supported in equilibrium even when the number of players in the game is large. This resolves the empirical puzzle of why the chance of swaying the election should matter, given that it is very small.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780355095272Subjects--Topical Terms:

555568
Economics.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Essays on Social Norms.
LDR:02483ntm a2200313K 4500 001 912340
005 20180608141652.5
006 m o u
007 cr mn||||a|a||
008 190606s2017 xx obm 000 0 eng d
020 $a 9780355095272
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI10267568
035 $a (MiAaPQ)upenngdas:12672
035 $a AAI10267568
040 $a MiAaPQ $b eng $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Janetos, Nicholas. $3 1184661
245 1 0 $a Essays on Social Norms.
264 0 $c 2017
300 $a 1 online resource (160 pages)
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-12(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Steven Matthews.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 2017.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a I study equilibrium behavior in games for which players have some preference for appearing to be well-informed. In chapter one, I study the effect of such preferences in a dynamic game where players have preferences for appearing to be well-informed about the actions of past players. I find that such games display cyclical behavior, which I interpret as a model of `fads'. I show that the speed of the fads is driven by the information available to less well-informed players. In chapter two, I study the effect of such preferences in a static game of voting with many players. Prior work studies voting games in which player's preferences are determined only by some disutility of voting, as well as some concern for swaying the outcome of the election to one's favored candidate. This literature finds that, in equilibrium, a vanishingly small percentage of the population votes, since the chance of swaying the election disappears as more players vote, while the cost of voting remains high for all. I introduce uncertainty about the quality of the candidates, as well as a preference for appearing to be well-informed about the candidates. I find that high levels of voter turnout are supported in equilibrium even when the number of players in the game is large. This resolves the empirical puzzle of why the chance of swaying the election should matter, given that it is very small.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Economics. $3 555568
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0501
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a University of Pennsylvania. $b Economics. $3 1179499
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10267568 $z click for full text (PQDT)