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Essays on Contract Theory and Mechanism Design.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays on Contract Theory and Mechanism Design./
Author:	Rodivilov, Alexander.
Description:	1 online resource (117 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-01(E), Section: A.
Subject:	Economic theory. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780355120790

Essays on Contract Theory and Mechanism Design.
Rodivilov, Alexander.

Essays on Contract Theory and Mechanism Design. - 1 online resource (117 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-01(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2017.

Includes bibliographical references

My dissertation investigates optimal contracts for experimentation and a matching problem for the runway slot allocation. The first chapter of my dissertation examines the role of monitoring in experimentation where agents may observe success privately. In the benchmark model without monitoring, private observability of success is inconsequential as the agent never wants to delay announcing success. However, with monitoring of the agent's effort, private observability of success plays a role in choosing the optimal time for monitoring. When success is observed publicly, the optimal time for a principal to hire a monitor is at the start of the relationship. On the contrary, if the agent observes success privately, and the discount factor is high enough, monitoring is performed during the final period. The second chapter discusses optimal contracts for both experimentation and production. It can be optimal to pay a rent after failure and over experimentation can be optimal. Over production can occur in the exploitation phase. The third chapter considers a financially significant matching problem that emerges when inclement weather conditions strike an airport and runway slots must be reallocated.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780355120790Subjects--Topical Terms:

809881
Economic theory.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Essays on Contract Theory and Mechanism Design.
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035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI10287217
035 $a (MiAaPQ)washington:17114
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040 $a MiAaPQ $b eng $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Rodivilov, Alexander. $3 1185417
245 1 0 $a Essays on Contract Theory and Mechanism Design.
264 0 $c 2017
300 $a 1 online resource (117 pages)
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-01(E), Section: A.
500 $a Advisers: Fahad Khalil; Jacques Lawarree.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2017.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a My dissertation investigates optimal contracts for experimentation and a matching problem for the runway slot allocation. The first chapter of my dissertation examines the role of monitoring in experimentation where agents may observe success privately. In the benchmark model without monitoring, private observability of success is inconsequential as the agent never wants to delay announcing success. However, with monitoring of the agent's effort, private observability of success plays a role in choosing the optimal time for monitoring. When success is observed publicly, the optimal time for a principal to hire a monitor is at the start of the relationship. On the contrary, if the agent observes success privately, and the discount factor is high enough, monitoring is performed during the final period. The second chapter discusses optimal contracts for both experimentation and production. It can be optimal to pay a rent after failure and over experimentation can be optimal. Over production can occur in the exploitation phase. The third chapter considers a financially significant matching problem that emerges when inclement weather conditions strike an airport and runway slots must be reallocated.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Economic theory. $3 809881
650 4 $a Economics. $3 555568
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0511
690 $a 0501
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a University of Washington. $b Economics. $3 1179102
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10287217 $z click for full text (PQDT)