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Three essays on conflict and conflict resolution between organizations.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Three essays on conflict and conflict resolution between organizations./
Author:	Kass, Malcolm John.
Description:	1 online resource (133 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-12(E), Section: A.
Subject:	Economics. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9781369062274

Three essays on conflict and conflict resolution between organizations.
Kass, Malcolm John.

Three essays on conflict and conflict resolution between organizations. - 1 online resource (133 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-12(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Texas at Dallas, 2016.

Includes bibliographical references

This dissertation has two segments. The first two chapters comprise the first segment and they examine cooperation in a specialized Prisoner's Dilemma setting. To induce cooperation, I introduce two institutions designed to not alter the strategic nature of the Prisoner's Dilemma. The first institution is labeled "cost sharing" where a player shares a fraction of the cost of cooperating with the other player. While cost sharing will either increase or leave unchanged the net benefits of cooperating, it does not alter the incentive structure of the Prisoner's Dilemma. Relative to a baseline with no cost sharing and controlling for game history, I find that mild forms of cost sharing are relatively ineffective to induce mutual cooperation in a one shot setting. Only at the maximum cost sharing level (equally sharing the cost of cooperating) does mutual cooperation occur above the baseline level. The second institution is endogenous selection via a unanimous voting mechanism where players determine the type of Prisoner's Dilemma to interact in. Using the previous results as a new baseline and controlling for selection bias concerns, I do not find increases in cooperation when allowing for unanimous voting. This supports the conjecture in the previous literature that the social welfare-enhancing effect of democracy may be dependent on institutions that align personal and collective incentives. The second segment is an examination of intergroup contest behavior under different forms of intergroup inequalities and post-hoc extreme intergroup costly punishment. I find increases in extreme costly punishment when two groups have asymmetric levels of contest resources (relative to a symmetric baseline condition), but only when the differences are imposed by a randomly chosen favored group. Under symmetric contests, individual ability is negatively correlated with the probability of extreme punishment, but is positively correlated when the randomly chosen favored group imposes the resource inequality.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9781369062274Subjects--Topical Terms:

555568
Economics.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Three essays on conflict and conflict resolution between organizations.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-12(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Daniel G. Arce M.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Texas at Dallas, 2016.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a This dissertation has two segments. The first two chapters comprise the first segment and they examine cooperation in a specialized Prisoner's Dilemma setting. To induce cooperation, I introduce two institutions designed to not alter the strategic nature of the Prisoner's Dilemma. The first institution is labeled "cost sharing" where a player shares a fraction of the cost of cooperating with the other player. While cost sharing will either increase or leave unchanged the net benefits of cooperating, it does not alter the incentive structure of the Prisoner's Dilemma. Relative to a baseline with no cost sharing and controlling for game history, I find that mild forms of cost sharing are relatively ineffective to induce mutual cooperation in a one shot setting. Only at the maximum cost sharing level (equally sharing the cost of cooperating) does mutual cooperation occur above the baseline level. The second institution is endogenous selection via a unanimous voting mechanism where players determine the type of Prisoner's Dilemma to interact in. Using the previous results as a new baseline and controlling for selection bias concerns, I do not find increases in cooperation when allowing for unanimous voting. This supports the conjecture in the previous literature that the social welfare-enhancing effect of democracy may be dependent on institutions that align personal and collective incentives. The second segment is an examination of intergroup contest behavior under different forms of intergroup inequalities and post-hoc extreme intergroup costly punishment. I find increases in extreme costly punishment when two groups have asymmetric levels of contest resources (relative to a symmetric baseline condition), but only when the differences are imposed by a randomly chosen favored group. Under symmetric contests, individual ability is negatively correlated with the probability of extreme punishment, but is positively correlated when the randomly chosen favored group imposes the resource inequality.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Economics. $3 555568
650 4 $a Political science. $3 558774
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0615
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a The University of Texas at Dallas. $b Economics. $3 1189260
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