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Do Greater Shareholder Voting Rights...
~
Li, Nan.
Do Greater Shareholder Voting Rights Reduce Expropriation? Evidence from Related Party Transactions.
Record Type:
Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:
Do Greater Shareholder Voting Rights Reduce Expropriation? Evidence from Related Party Transactions./
Author:
Li, Nan.
Description:
1 online resource (80 pages)
Notes:
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-09(E), Section: A.
Contained By:
Dissertation Abstracts International79-09A(E).
Subject:
Accounting. -
Online resource:
click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:
9780355916195
Do Greater Shareholder Voting Rights Reduce Expropriation? Evidence from Related Party Transactions.
Li, Nan.
Do Greater Shareholder Voting Rights Reduce Expropriation? Evidence from Related Party Transactions.
- 1 online resource (80 pages)
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-09(E), Section: A.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Columbia University, 2018.
Includes bibliographical references
In the presence of business groups, the expropriation through related party transactions (RPTs) is common and costly to minority shareholders. At the same time, it is well recognized that RPTs can help firms overcome market shortcomings. Using the setting of India's RPT voting rule, I find that a mandatory and binding shareholder voting mechanism helps filter out expropriation. Minority shareholders actively raise their voice against RPT resolutions, resulting in substantial shareholder dissent. My difference-in-difference analysis reveals that shareholder voting has a significant deterrence effect on RPT volume, especially on financial RPTs. I also find that stock prices react positively to news signaling the passage of the voting rule, and that the association between firm profitability and RPT increases following rule's adoption, suggesting that rule has a positive effect on shareholder value. Lastly, I show that mandatory RPT voting makes Indian firms more attractive to foreign institutional investors.
Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018
Mode of access: World Wide Web
ISBN: 9780355916195Subjects--Topical Terms:
561166
Accounting.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:
554714
Electronic books.
Do Greater Shareholder Voting Rights Reduce Expropriation? Evidence from Related Party Transactions.
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Do Greater Shareholder Voting Rights Reduce Expropriation? Evidence from Related Party Transactions.
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Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-09(E), Section: A.
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Advisers: Shivaram Rajgopal; Fabrizio Ferri.
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Columbia University, 2018.
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Includes bibliographical references
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In the presence of business groups, the expropriation through related party transactions (RPTs) is common and costly to minority shareholders. At the same time, it is well recognized that RPTs can help firms overcome market shortcomings. Using the setting of India's RPT voting rule, I find that a mandatory and binding shareholder voting mechanism helps filter out expropriation. Minority shareholders actively raise their voice against RPT resolutions, resulting in substantial shareholder dissent. My difference-in-difference analysis reveals that shareholder voting has a significant deterrence effect on RPT volume, especially on financial RPTs. I also find that stock prices react positively to news signaling the passage of the voting rule, and that the association between firm profitability and RPT increases following rule's adoption, suggesting that rule has a positive effect on shareholder value. Lastly, I show that mandatory RPT voting makes Indian firms more attractive to foreign institutional investors.
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Ann Arbor, Mich. :
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Mode of access: World Wide Web
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click for full text (PQDT)
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