國立虎尾科技大學 |

Transparency in Perceptual Experience.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Transparency in Perceptual Experience./
Author:	Andrews, Austin Carter.
Description:	1 online resource (100 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-07(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International79-07A(E).
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780355573718

Transparency in Perceptual Experience.
Andrews, Austin Carter.

Transparency in Perceptual Experience. - 1 online resource (100 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-07(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2017.

Includes bibliographical references

Perceptual experience, and visual experience in particular, is often held to be 'transparent' in that when you try to focus on your experience you find that you can only focus on the subject matter of your experience. For example, when you look at your hand and try to focus on your visual experience of it, it is natural to admit that the only thing you find yourself able to focus on is your hand. But, of course, hands and visual experiences are two quite different things. In this way your experience, but not your hand, is transparent to you. In the dissertation I discuss the so- called transparency of experience at length.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780355573718Subjects--Topical Terms:

559771
Philosophy.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Transparency in Perceptual Experience.
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100 1 $a Andrews, Austin Carter. $3 1193027
245 1 0 $a Transparency in Perceptual Experience.
264 0 $c 2017
300 $a 1 online resource (100 pages)
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-07(E), Section: A.
500 $a Advisers: Geoffrey Lee; John Campbell.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2017.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a Perceptual experience, and visual experience in particular, is often held to be 'transparent' in that when you try to focus on your experience you find that you can only focus on the subject matter of your experience. For example, when you look at your hand and try to focus on your visual experience of it, it is natural to admit that the only thing you find yourself able to focus on is your hand. But, of course, hands and visual experiences are two quite different things. In this way your experience, but not your hand, is transparent to you. In the dissertation I discuss the so- called transparency of experience at length.
520 $a The first half of the book aims to make the idea of transparency of philosophically precise. The results of this section of the book generate an understanding of transparency which differs in important ways from how transparency is typically understood in the literature. The second half of the book utilizes this understanding of transparency to query the philosophical significance of transparency. In this portion of the book I argue that transparency is not very illuminating when it comes to questions concerning the nature of perceptual experience. Most philosophers who write about transparency disagree with this and the reason for this is that most philosophers have a mistaken understanding of transparency. When one understands transparency properly, it is clear that the truth of transparency would have no direct impact on what we should say about the metaphysics of perceptual experience. I then argue that transparency is significant from an epistemological point of view. The basic thought I elaborate on is that if our perceptual experiences are transparent then they are first-personally elusive in the sense that when we, the subjects of experience, go to look for our perceptual experiences they are nowhere to be found. Thus transparency raises a number of puzzles concerning our ability to think and know about our own perceptual experiences given their elusiveness. After raising these puzzles I propose a solution to them which treats our understanding of visual experience as theoretical, rather than as something which is given to us introspectively.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 559771
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0422
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a University of California, Berkeley. $b Philosophy. $3 1182449
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 79-07A(E).
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10618700 $z click for full text (PQDT)