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Intentionality, Determinacy, and Rules : = Kripke's Paradox and the Normativity of Intentional Content.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Intentionality, Determinacy, and Rules :/
Reminder of title:	Kripke's Paradox and the Normativity of Intentional Content.
Author:	Green, Derek Alexander.
Description:	1 online resource (265 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-02(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International76-02A(E).
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9781321216967

Intentionality, Determinacy, and Rules : = Kripke's Paradox and the Normativity of Intentional Content.
Green, Derek Alexander.

Intentionality, Determinacy, and Rules :Kripke's Paradox and the Normativity of Intentional Content. - 1 online resource (265 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-02(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2014.

Includes bibliographical references

The dissertation makes three significant contributions to the theory of intentionality.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9781321216967Subjects--Topical Terms:

559771
Philosophy.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Intentionality, Determinacy, and Rules : = Kripke's Paradox and the Normativity of Intentional Content.
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245 1 0 $a Intentionality, Determinacy, and Rules : $b Kripke's Paradox and the Normativity of Intentional Content.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-02(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Sanford C. Goldberg.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2014.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a The dissertation makes three significant contributions to the theory of intentionality.
520 $a The first two are answers to an ingenious skepticism about intentionality devised by Saul Kripke. Kripke's skeptic argues that all plausible conceptions of the facts about what subjects mean or think are false. They fail to make intentional contents determinate, in large part because nothing about a subject could guide her to use contents' bearers in accord with what they bear. Thus, no one means or thinks anything.
520 $a Part One of the dissertation answers the skepticism under both of its plausible interpretations. On the first interpretation, something has to guide the subject's use of a content in every possible case of use, or else intentional content does not exist. But this assumption is false. Kripke and commentators fail to recognize that a well-motivated theory of self-knowledge provides distinct, attainable, legitimate sufficient conditions for intentional content.
520 $a On the second interpretation, the skeptic simply alleges that it is indeterminate what anyone means or thinks. The failure of this version has never been properly diagnosed. It fails, I claim, due to the explanatory role of intentional content. Contents might be nothing more than posits in an empirical psychological theory. If so, the skeptic never impugns our empirical confidence in content ascriptions. But many, Kripke included, think ascription is also a normative enterprise. If, however, Kripke is right in this, then the skepticism fails - the very problems the skeptic points to are just functions of what real, existing content turns out to be. The skepticism thus fails, whatever content's explanatory role.
520 $a The dissertation's third contribution concerns a debate with roots in the discussion of Kripke's skepticism. I defend the normativity of mental conceptual content. That one grasps a concept puts rules in force for judging with it. Positions like mine have been overlooked because many reduplicate one of Kripke's mistakes from above. They think that a rule enjoins an agent only if it can guide her in all applicable cases. But conceptual rules, I argue, can be in force regardless. So the space of the normative is much broader than usually thought.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 559771
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
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710 2 $a Northwestern University. $b Philosophy. $3 1193140
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 76-02A(E).
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3638177 $z click for full text (PQDT)