國立虎尾科技大學 |

A Science-Based Critique of Epistemological Naturalism in Quine’s Tradition

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	A Science-Based Critique of Epistemological Naturalism in Quine’s Tradition/ by Reto Gubelmann.
作者:	Gubelmann, Reto.
面頁冊數:	XIX, 286 p. 5 illus., 3 illus. in color.online resource. :
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
標題:	Epistemology. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24524-5
ISBN:	9783030245245

A Science-Based Critique of Epistemological Naturalism in Quine’s Tradition
Gubelmann, Reto.

A Science-Based Critique of Epistemological Naturalism in Quine’s Tradition[electronic resource] /by Reto Gubelmann. - 1st ed. 2019. - XIX, 286 p. 5 illus., 3 illus. in color.online resource.

1. Introduction -- 2. Quine I: The Bold Physicalism of Word and Object -- 3. Quine II: The Evolutionary-Perceptional Account -- 4. Burge: Proto-Predicates in Perceptual Representations -- 5. Maddy: Conceiving Logic as an Innate Cognitive Mechanism -- 6.Quine's Empiricist Justificatory Monism -- 7. Why Justificatory Monism Needs Scientific Realism -- 8. Scientifically Defending Realism I: Psillos' Holistic Approach -- 9. Scientifically Defending Realism II: Maddy's Piecemeal Realism -- 10. Conclusion.

At the intersection of epistemology, metaphilosophy, and philosophy of science, this exciting new book examines the epistemic limits of empirical science. It makes a unique contribution to research on epistemological naturalism in Quine’s tradition by criticizing the position based on first-order data from empirical psychology and the history of natural science. This way, it meets the naturalist on their own ground not only regarding subject matter, but also regarding their epistemic methods. The book explores the works of a variety of philosophers in the field, including W. V. Quine, Penelope Maddy, Tyler Burge, Stathis Psillos and Howard Sankey. By carefully considering experimental results from behaviourism as well as developmental and perceptual psychology, Gubelmann finds that none of these disciplines can furnish the epistemic means to successfully naturalize the central cognitive preconditions of scientific theorizing. Furthermore, Gubelmann presents novel arguments for the claims that epistemological naturalists are committed to scientific realism, and that they are unable to defend this position. Based on these results, Gubelmann concludes that epistemology is not part of empirical science, which directly contradicts epistemological naturalism.

ISBN: 9783030245245

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-030-24524-5doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

671538
Epistemology.

LC Class. No.: BD143-237

Dewey Class. No.: 120

A Science-Based Critique of Epistemological Naturalism in Quine’s Tradition
LDR:03166nam a22003975i 4500 001 1003768
003 DE-He213
005 20200704203957.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 210106s2019 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020 $a 9783030245245 $9 978-3-030-24524-5
024 7 $a 10.1007/978-3-030-24524-5 $2 doi
035 $a 978-3-030-24524-5
050 4 $a BD143-237
072 7 $a HPK $2 bicssc
072 7 $a PHI004000 $2 bisacsh
072 7 $a QDTK $2 thema
082 0 4 $a 120 $2 23
100 1 $a Gubelmann, Reto. $4 aut $4 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut $3 1229837
245 1 2 $a A Science-Based Critique of Epistemological Naturalism in Quine’s Tradition $h [electronic resource] / $c by Reto Gubelmann.
250 $a 1st ed. 2019.
264 1 $a Cham : $b Springer International Publishing : $b Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan, $c 2019.
300 $a XIX, 286 p. 5 illus., 3 illus. in color. $b online resource.
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
347 $a text file $b PDF $2 rda
505 0 $a 1. Introduction -- 2. Quine I: The Bold Physicalism of Word and Object -- 3. Quine II: The Evolutionary-Perceptional Account -- 4. Burge: Proto-Predicates in Perceptual Representations -- 5. Maddy: Conceiving Logic as an Innate Cognitive Mechanism -- 6.Quine's Empiricist Justificatory Monism -- 7. Why Justificatory Monism Needs Scientific Realism -- 8. Scientifically Defending Realism I: Psillos' Holistic Approach -- 9. Scientifically Defending Realism II: Maddy's Piecemeal Realism -- 10. Conclusion.
520 $a At the intersection of epistemology, metaphilosophy, and philosophy of science, this exciting new book examines the epistemic limits of empirical science. It makes a unique contribution to research on epistemological naturalism in Quine’s tradition by criticizing the position based on first-order data from empirical psychology and the history of natural science. This way, it meets the naturalist on their own ground not only regarding subject matter, but also regarding their epistemic methods. The book explores the works of a variety of philosophers in the field, including W. V. Quine, Penelope Maddy, Tyler Burge, Stathis Psillos and Howard Sankey. By carefully considering experimental results from behaviourism as well as developmental and perceptual psychology, Gubelmann finds that none of these disciplines can furnish the epistemic means to successfully naturalize the central cognitive preconditions of scientific theorizing. Furthermore, Gubelmann presents novel arguments for the claims that epistemological naturalists are committed to scientific realism, and that they are unable to defend this position. Based on these results, Gubelmann concludes that epistemology is not part of empirical science, which directly contradicts epistemological naturalism.
650 0 $a Epistemology. $3 671538
650 0 $a Philosophy and science. $3 555818
650 2 4 $a Philosophy of Science. $3 668204
710 2 $a SpringerLink (Online service) $3 593884
773 0 $t Springer Nature eBook
776 0 8 $i Printed edition: $z 9783030245238
776 0 8 $i Printed edition: $z 9783030245252
776 0 8 $i Printed edition: $z 9783030245269
856 4 0 $u https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24524-5
912 $a ZDB-2-REP
912 $a ZDB-2-SXPR
950 $a Religion and Philosophy (SpringerNature-41175)
950 $a Philosophy and Religion (R0) (SpringerNature-43725)