國立虎尾科技大學 |

Philosophy and the 'Dazzling Ideal' of Science

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Philosophy and the 'Dazzling Ideal' of Science/ by Graham McFee.
作者:	McFee, Graham.
面頁冊數:	XVII, 338 p.online resource. :
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21675-7
ISBN:	9783030216757

Philosophy and the 'Dazzling Ideal' of Science
McFee, Graham.

Philosophy and the 'Dazzling Ideal' of Science[electronic resource] /by Graham McFee. - 1st ed. 2019. - XVII, 338 p.online resource.

Chapter One: Introductory — A still point in a turning world? -- Chapter Two: Persons as Agents: The Possibility of Genuine Action -- Chapter Three: What Persons Are: Identity, Personal Identity and Composition -- Chapter Four: What Persons are Not: Causality, Minds and the Brain -- Chapter Five: Evolutionary Explanation in Psychology: Not an Issue for Philosophy? -- Chapter Six: Persons, Artificial Intelligence, and Science Fiction Thought-Experiments -- Chapter Seven: Considerations of Exceptionlessness in Philosophy: or, ‘Everything … ‘ -- Chapter Eight: Philosophy without Exceptionlessness -- Chapter Nine: Conclusion: The Place of Reason.

Recent decades have seen attacks on philosophy as an irrelevant field of inquiry when compared with science. In this book, Graham McFee defends the claims of philosophy against attempts to minimize either philosophy’s possibility or its importance by deploying a contrast with what Wittgenstein characterized as the “dazzling ideal” of science. This ‘dazzling ideal’ incorporates both the imagined completeness of scientific explanation—whereby completing its project would leave nothing unexplained—and the exceptionless character of the associated conception of causality. On such a scientistic world-view, what need is there for philosophy? In his defense of philosophy (and its truth-claims), McFee shows that rejecting such scientism is not automatically anti-scientific, and that it permits granting to natural science (properly understood) its own truth-generating power. Further, McFee argues for contextualism in the project of philosophy, and sets aside the pervasive (and pernicious) requirement for exceptionless generalizations while relating his account to interconnections between the concepts of person, substance, agency, and causation.

ISBN: 9783030216757

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-030-21675-7doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

559771
Philosophy.

LC Class. No.: B53

Dewey Class. No.: 128

Philosophy and the 'Dazzling Ideal' of Science
LDR:03141nam a22003975i 4500 001 1006470
003 DE-He213
005 20200702224439.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 210106s2019 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020 $a 9783030216757 $9 978-3-030-21675-7
024 7 $a 10.1007/978-3-030-21675-7 $2 doi
035 $a 978-3-030-21675-7
050 4 $a B53
072 7 $a HP $2 bicssc
072 7 $a PHI000000 $2 bisacsh
072 7 $a QD $2 thema
082 0 4 $a 128 $2 23
100 1 $a McFee, Graham. $4 aut $4 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut $3 714958
245 1 0 $a Philosophy and the 'Dazzling Ideal' of Science $h [electronic resource] / $c by Graham McFee.
250 $a 1st ed. 2019.
264 1 $a Cham : $b Springer International Publishing : $b Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan, $c 2019.
300 $a XVII, 338 p. $b online resource.
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
347 $a text file $b PDF $2 rda
505 0 $a Chapter One: Introductory — A still point in a turning world? -- Chapter Two: Persons as Agents: The Possibility of Genuine Action -- Chapter Three: What Persons Are: Identity, Personal Identity and Composition -- Chapter Four: What Persons are Not: Causality, Minds and the Brain -- Chapter Five: Evolutionary Explanation in Psychology: Not an Issue for Philosophy? -- Chapter Six: Persons, Artificial Intelligence, and Science Fiction Thought-Experiments -- Chapter Seven: Considerations of Exceptionlessness in Philosophy: or, ‘Everything … ‘ -- Chapter Eight: Philosophy without Exceptionlessness -- Chapter Nine: Conclusion: The Place of Reason.
520 $a Recent decades have seen attacks on philosophy as an irrelevant field of inquiry when compared with science. In this book, Graham McFee defends the claims of philosophy against attempts to minimize either philosophy’s possibility or its importance by deploying a contrast with what Wittgenstein characterized as the “dazzling ideal” of science. This ‘dazzling ideal’ incorporates both the imagined completeness of scientific explanation—whereby completing its project would leave nothing unexplained—and the exceptionless character of the associated conception of causality. On such a scientistic world-view, what need is there for philosophy? In his defense of philosophy (and its truth-claims), McFee shows that rejecting such scientism is not automatically anti-scientific, and that it permits granting to natural science (properly understood) its own truth-generating power. Further, McFee argues for contextualism in the project of philosophy, and sets aside the pervasive (and pernicious) requirement for exceptionless generalizations while relating his account to interconnections between the concepts of person, substance, agency, and causation.
650 0 $a Philosophy. $3 559771
650 1 4 $a Philosophy of Man. $3 671690
710 2 $a SpringerLink (Online service) $3 593884
773 0 $t Springer Nature eBook
776 0 8 $i Printed edition: $z 9783030216740
776 0 8 $i Printed edition: $z 9783030216764
776 0 8 $i Printed edition: $z 9783030216771
856 4 0 $u https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21675-7
912 $a ZDB-2-REP
912 $a ZDB-2-SXPR
950 $a Religion and Philosophy (SpringerNature-41175)
950 $a Philosophy and Religion (R0) (SpringerNature-43725)