國立虎尾科技大學 |

Self-Feeling = Can Self-Consciousness be Understood as a Feeling? /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Self-Feeling/ by Gerhard Kreuch.
其他題名:	Can Self-Consciousness be Understood as a Feeling? /
作者:	Kreuch, Gerhard.
面頁冊數:	XVII, 266 p.online resource. :
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
標題:	Phenomenology . -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30789-9
ISBN:	9783030307899

Self-Feeling = Can Self-Consciousness be Understood as a Feeling? /
Kreuch, Gerhard.

Self-FeelingCan Self-Consciousness be Understood as a Feeling? /[electronic resource] :by Gerhard Kreuch. - 1st ed. 2019. - XVII, 266 p.online resource. - Contributions to Phenomenology, In Cooperation with The Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology,1070923-9545 ;. - Contributions to Phenomenology, In Cooperation with The Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology,73.

Chapter 1. Introduction -- Part I. Self-Consciousness -- Chapter 2. A Brief Overview of Philosophy of Self-Consciousness -- Chapter 3. Challenges in Current Philosophy of Self-Consciousness – The Heidelberg School -- Chapter 4. The Affective Turn -- Part II. Affectivity -- Chapter 5. A Brief Overview of Philosophy of Human Affectivity -- Chapter 6. Matthew Ratcliffe’s Theory of Existential Feelings -- Chapter 7. Stephan and Slaby´s Complementary Work -- Part III. Self-Feeling -- Chapter 8. The Features of Self-Feeling -- Chapter 9. How this Account of Self-Feeling Contributes to Today´s Debates -- Chapter 10. Self-Feeling and Unity -- Chapter 11. Appropriateness of Self-Feeling -- Part IV. Self-Feeling and Thought: Self-Interpretation -- Chapter 12. Self-Interpretation -- Chapter 13. Appropriateness and Inappropriateness in Self-Interpretation -- Chapter 14. Authenticity.

This monograph offers new insights into the connection between self-consciousness and emotion. It focuses on what fundamental “feelings of being” tell us about ourselves. The results enrich the philosophy of human affectivity and help shed new light on some pressing, current problems. The author seeks to understand self-consciousness as an affective phenomenon, namely as self-feeling. He identifies it as a pre-reflective, pre-propositional, bodily feeling that shapes our space of possibilities. It is the affective disclosure of individual existence. His account overcomes the difficulties of infinite regress and vicious circularity that reflective (or higher-order) accounts of self-consciousness struggle with. At the same time, it helps build a bridge between the basic level of self-consciousness and the higher level of more substantial thoughts about oneself. The title explores fundamental affectivity, Matthew Ratcliffe’s theory of existential feelings, features of self-feeling, and appropriateness and inappropriateness in self-interpretation. It also considers the contributions of the Heidelberg School of self-consciousness to current debates. The title provides students and researchers with a unique look into such vital philosophical questions as: What is self-consciousness? How do we know ourselves? It will also appeal to a wider audience interested in self-consciousness and/or human affectivity since it does not presuppose knowledge of the jargon.

ISBN: 9783030307899

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-030-30789-9doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

1253735
Phenomenology .

LC Class. No.: B829.5.A-829.5.Z

Dewey Class. No.: 142.7

Self-Feeling = Can Self-Consciousness be Understood as a Feeling? /
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