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Seemings and Epistemic Justification = How Appearances Justify Beliefs /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Seemings and Epistemic Justification/ by Luca Moretti.
其他題名:	How Appearances Justify Beliefs /
作者:	Moretti, Luca.
面頁冊數:	VIII, 91 p. 1 illus.online resource. :
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
標題:	Philosophy of Language. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43392-5
ISBN:	9783030433925

Seemings and Epistemic Justification = How Appearances Justify Beliefs /
Moretti, Luca.

Seemings and Epistemic JustificationHow Appearances Justify Beliefs /[electronic resource] :by Luca Moretti. - 1st ed. 2020. - VIII, 91 p. 1 illus.online resource. - SpringerBriefs in Philosophy,2211-4548. - SpringerBriefs in Philosophy,.

1. Introduction -- 2. Phenomenal Conservatism -- 3. Bayesian objections -- 4. Easy justification -- 5. The problem of reflective awareness -- 6. Inferential seemings and reflective awareness -- 7. Conclusions.

This book examines phenomenal conservatism, one of the most influential and promising internalist conceptions of non-inferential justification debated in current epistemology and philosophy of mind. It also explores the significance of the findings of this examination for the general debate on epistemic justification. According to phenomenal conservatism, non-inferential justification rests on seemings or appearances, conceived of as experiences provided with propositional content. Phenomenal conservatism states that if it appears to S that P, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has some justification for believing that P. This view provides the basis for foundationalism and many ordinary epistemic practices. This book sheds new light on phenomenal conservatism by assessing objections to it and examining epistemological merits and advantages attributed to it. In a nutshell, phenomenal conservatism is actually compatible with Bayesian reasoning, and it is unaffected by bootstrapping problems and challenges that appeal to the cognitive penetrability of perception. Nevertheless, appearance-based justification proves unstable or elusive and its anti-septical bite is more limited than expected. These difficulties could be surmounted if phenomenal conservatism were integrated with a theory of inferential justification. The book appeals to scholars and postgraduates in the field of epistemology and philosophy of mind who are interested in the rational roles of appearances. .

ISBN: 9783030433925

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-030-43392-5doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

671588
Philosophy of Language.

LC Class. No.: BD143-237

Dewey Class. No.: 120

Seemings and Epistemic Justification = How Appearances Justify Beliefs /
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