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The Theory of Credit Contracts = With a Focus on Group Lending /

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The Theory of Credit Contracts/ by Christian Prem.
Reminder of title:	With a Focus on Group Lending /
Author:	Prem, Christian.
Description:	XVII, 281 p. 79 illus.online resource. :
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
Subject:	Bank marketing. -
Online resource:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-29362-8
ISBN:	9783658293628

The Theory of Credit Contracts = With a Focus on Group Lending /
Prem, Christian.

The Theory of Credit ContractsWith a Focus on Group Lending /[electronic resource] :by Christian Prem. - 1st ed. 2020. - XVII, 281 p. 79 illus.online resource.

A structural analysis of credit contract theory -- The treatment of credit contract theory in the literature -- A standardisation of credit contract theory -- Joint liability and its potential to cause adverse selection instead of resolving it -- The perverse effect of joint liability and its disappearance under adaptive punishment -- Cross-reporting with zero equilibrium punishment load.

In this book Christian Prem features new innovations on several levels. On a conceptual level he presents a complete restructuring and modularisation of the field of lending theory. On a formal level he bestows great care on providing precise definitions and promotes notational standardisation. On a technical level the development of an algorithm to solve repayment games automatically is thoroughly documented. Eventually, new theoretic results on the performance of various credit schemes are established, the quality of existing lending schemes is scrutinised and new more efficient mechanisms are presented. The content therefore inspires theorists as well as it provides well-grounded advice to practitioners in the lending industry. Altogether this thesis is a major step towards improving the quality and applicability of lending theory. Contents A structural analysis of credit contract theory The treatment of credit contract theory in the literature A standardisation of credit contract theory Joint liability and its potential to cause adverse selection instead of resolving it The perverse effect of joint liability and its disappearance under adaptive punishment Cross-reporting with zero equilibrium punishment load Target Groups Scholars and students in economics with a focus on finance Scientists, lecturers, bank managers, loan officers, economic politicians The Author Christian Prem, Master of Advanced Studies in Mathematics (University of Cambridge, UK).

ISBN: 9783658293628

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-658-29362-8doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

1202153
Bank marketing.

LC Class. No.: HG1616.M3

Dewey Class. No.: 332.17

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