國立虎尾科技大學 |

Strategic Interaction Between Islamist Terror Groups = A Game Theoretic Approach /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Strategic Interaction Between Islamist Terror Groups/ by Nina Ismael.
其他題名:	A Game Theoretic Approach /
作者:	Ismael, Nina.
面頁冊數:	XI, 91 p. 15 illus., 2 illus. in color.online resource. :
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
標題:	Economic theory. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51307-8
ISBN:	9783030513078

Strategic Interaction Between Islamist Terror Groups = A Game Theoretic Approach /
Ismael, Nina.

Strategic Interaction Between Islamist Terror GroupsA Game Theoretic Approach /[electronic resource] :by Nina Ismael. - 1st ed. 2020. - XI, 91 p. 15 illus., 2 illus. in color.online resource. - SpringerBriefs in Economics,2191-5504. - SpringerBriefs in Economics,.

Introduction -- On Terrorism -- Terrorism as a Mode of Warfare -- The Economics of Terrorism -- Competition Between Homogeneous Terrorist Organizations: A General Model -- Al-Qaeda and Daesh: The Rise of the Islamic State -- Conclusion.

This book applies game theory to the phenomenon of terrorism and investigates how the competition for support can influence the attack behavior of terror organizations. In addition, it examines the economics of terrorism. The so-called outbidding theory, which has become increasingly popular within the field of terrorism research, argues that terror groups vying for resources will engage in more and more violence to demonstrate their capabilities and commitment to their cause. This book challenges the outbidding concept by providing a game-theoretical analysis, which shows that a contest between two terror groups can be interpreted as a race for support. This interpretation may help explain why major attacks occur at all: not as a result of outbidding, but as a result of losing the race. In addition, the author shows that rivalry between terror groups does not necessarily lead to more attacks, but can result in less terrorism due to an increased probability of attack failure induced by the race. Lastly, the model is applied to the rivalry between al-Qaeda and Daesh, elaborated on with empirical evidence. Given its scope, the book is a must read for researches and scholars working in the fields of economics, politics, the social sciences, and military history, as well as military and political decision-makers and authorities working in the field of risk management. .

ISBN: 9783030513078

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-030-51307-8doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

809881
Economic theory.

LC Class. No.: HB1-846.8

Dewey Class. No.: 330.1

Strategic Interaction Between Islamist Terror Groups = A Game Theoretic Approach /
LDR:03005nam a22003975i 4500 001 1025368
003 DE-He213
005 20201110091601.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 210318s2020 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020 $a 9783030513078 $9 978-3-030-51307-8
024 7 $a 10.1007/978-3-030-51307-8 $2 doi
035 $a 978-3-030-51307-8
050 4 $a HB1-846.8
072 7 $a KCA $2 bicssc
072 7 $a BUS069030 $2 bisacsh
072 7 $a KCA $2 thema
082 0 4 $a 330.1 $2 23
100 1 $a Ismael, Nina. $e author. $4 aut $4 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut $3 1321632
245 1 0 $a Strategic Interaction Between Islamist Terror Groups $h [electronic resource] : $b A Game Theoretic Approach / $c by Nina Ismael.
250 $a 1st ed. 2020.
264 1 $a Cham : $b Springer International Publishing : $b Imprint: Springer, $c 2020.
300 $a XI, 91 p. 15 illus., 2 illus. in color. $b online resource.
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
347 $a text file $b PDF $2 rda
490 1 $a SpringerBriefs in Economics, $x 2191-5504
505 0 $a Introduction -- On Terrorism -- Terrorism as a Mode of Warfare -- The Economics of Terrorism -- Competition Between Homogeneous Terrorist Organizations: A General Model -- Al-Qaeda and Daesh: The Rise of the Islamic State -- Conclusion.
520 $a This book applies game theory to the phenomenon of terrorism and investigates how the competition for support can influence the attack behavior of terror organizations. In addition, it examines the economics of terrorism. The so-called outbidding theory, which has become increasingly popular within the field of terrorism research, argues that terror groups vying for resources will engage in more and more violence to demonstrate their capabilities and commitment to their cause. This book challenges the outbidding concept by providing a game-theoretical analysis, which shows that a contest between two terror groups can be interpreted as a race for support. This interpretation may help explain why major attacks occur at all: not as a result of outbidding, but as a result of losing the race. In addition, the author shows that rivalry between terror groups does not necessarily lead to more attacks, but can result in less terrorism due to an increased probability of attack failure induced by the race. Lastly, the model is applied to the rivalry between al-Qaeda and Daesh, elaborated on with empirical evidence. Given its scope, the book is a must read for researches and scholars working in the fields of economics, politics, the social sciences, and military history, as well as military and political decision-makers and authorities working in the field of risk management. .
650 0 $a Economic theory. $3 809881
650 0 $a Terrorism. $3 557490
650 0 $a Political violence. $3 567618
650 1 4 $a Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods. $3 1069071
650 2 4 $a Terrorism and Political Violence. $3 1105326
710 2 $a SpringerLink (Online service) $3 593884
773 0 $t Springer Nature eBook
776 0 8 $i Printed edition: $z 9783030513061
776 0 8 $i Printed edition: $z 9783030513085
830 0 $a SpringerBriefs in Economics, $x 2191-5504 $3 1256355
856 4 0 $u https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51307-8
912 $a ZDB-2-ECF
912 $a ZDB-2-SXEF
950 $a Economics and Finance (SpringerNature-41170)
950 $a Economics and Finance (R0) (SpringerNature-43720)