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Active Cognition = Challenges to an Aristotelian Tradition /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Active Cognition/ edited by Véronique Decaix, Ana María Mora-Márquez.
其他題名:	Challenges to an Aristotelian Tradition /
其他作者:	Mora-Márquez, Ana María.
面頁冊數:	V, 196 p. 1 illus.online resource. :
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
標題:	History of Philosophy. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35304-9
ISBN:	9783030353049

Active Cognition = Challenges to an Aristotelian Tradition /
Active CognitionChallenges to an Aristotelian Tradition /[electronic resource] :edited by Véronique Decaix, Ana María Mora-Márquez. - 1st ed. 2020. - V, 196 p. 1 illus.online resource. - Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind,231573-5834 ;. - Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind,10.

Chapter 1. Selective Attention Beyond Activity: Robert Kilwardby’s Theory of Perception (Elena Baltuta) -- Chapter 2. From Agent to Active Sense: Was there an Agustinianism-Averroisant? (José Filipe da Silva) -- Chapter 3. Cognition as Intellectual Constitution: Dietrich of Freiberg in Discussion with Thomas Aquinas (Véronique Decaix) -- Chapter 4. Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias on Active Intellectual Cognition (Frans de Haas) -- Chapter 5. Explaining Sherlock’s Glance: On the Perception of Historical Past (Vincent Grondin) -- Chapter 6. Epistemic Responsibility in an Occasionalist World: Malebranche’s Theory of Judgement (Stephan Schmid) -- Chapter 7. A Note on Stumpf’s History of Active Intellection (Hamid Taieb) -- Chapter 8. Three Jesuit Accounts of Cognition: Differences and Common Ground in the De anima Commentaries by Maldonado, Toledo and Dandini (1564-1610) (Anna Tropia).

This edited work draws on a range of contributed expertise to trace the fortune of an Aristotelian thesis over different periods in the history of philosophy. It presents eight cases of direct or indirect challenges to the Aristotelian passive account of human cognition, taking the reader from late antiquity to the 20th century. Chapters analyse the (often indirect) effect of Aristotle’s account of cognition on later periods. In his influential De anima, Aristotle describes human cognition, both sensitive and intellectual, as the reception of a form in the cognitive subject. Aristotle’s account has been commonly interpreted as fundamentally passive – the cognitive subject is a passive actor upon which a cognitive process is acted by the object. However, at least from the time of Alexander of Aphrodisias onwards, this interpretation has been challenged by authors who posit a fundamental active aspect of cognition. Readers will discover how one or more of three concerns – ontological superiority, direct realism and moral responsibility – drive the active accounts of cognition. Contributed chapters from top scholars examine how these three concerns lead thinkers to take issue with the idea that cognition is a passive process. The authors consider Jesuit accounts of cognition, Malebranche on judgment, and Wittgenstein on perception, as well as Stumpf on active cognition, among other relevant works. This book is ideally suited to scholars of philosophy, especially those with an interest in medieval epistemology, the influence of Aristotle, philosophy of mind and theories of cognition.

ISBN: 9783030353049

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-030-35304-9doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

671574
History of Philosophy.

LC Class. No.: B53

Dewey Class. No.: 128.2

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