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Emotions as Original Existences = A Theory of Emotion, Motivation and the Self /

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Emotions as Original Existences/ by Demian Whiting.
Reminder of title:	A Theory of Emotion, Motivation and the Self /
Author:	Whiting, Demian.
Description:	XI, 233 p.online resource. :
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
Subject:	Philosophy of mind. -
Online resource:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54682-3
ISBN:	9783030546823

Emotions as Original Existences = A Theory of Emotion, Motivation and the Self /
Whiting, Demian.

Emotions as Original ExistencesA Theory of Emotion, Motivation and the Self /[electronic resource] :by Demian Whiting. - 1st ed. 2020. - XI, 233 p.online resource.

Chapter 1: Introduction -- Chapter 2: Emotions as Conscious Mental States -- Chapter 3: Emotions as Original Existences -- Chapter 4: Urges of the Heart -- Chapter 5: Emotion and Moral Thought -- Chapter 6: Emotion, Virtue, and Situationism -- Chapter 7: Our Emotional Cores -- Chapter 8: Emotion and The Fractured Self.

This book defends the much-disputed view that emotions are what Hume referred to as ‘original existences’: feeling states that have no intentional or representational properties of their own. In doing so, the book serves as a valuable counterbalance to the now mainstream view that emotions are representational mental states. Beginning with a defence of a feeling theory of emotion, Whiting opens up a whole new way of thinking about the role and centrality of emotion in our lives, showing how emotion is key to a proper understanding of human motivation and the self. Whiting establishes that emotions as types of bodily feelings serve as the categorical bases for our behavioural dispositions, including those associated with moral thought, virtue, and vice. The book concludes by advancing the idea that emotions make up our intrinsic nature - the characterisation of what we are like in and of ourselves, when considered apart from how we are disposed to behave. The conclusion additionally draws out the implications of the claims made throughout the book in relation to our understanding of mental illness and the treatment of emotional disorders.

ISBN: 9783030546823

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-030-54682-3doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

555804
Philosophy of mind.

LC Class. No.: B53

Dewey Class. No.: 128.2

Emotions as Original Existences = A Theory of Emotion, Motivation and the Self /
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505 0 $a Chapter 1: Introduction -- Chapter 2: Emotions as Conscious Mental States -- Chapter 3: Emotions as Original Existences -- Chapter 4: Urges of the Heart -- Chapter 5: Emotion and Moral Thought -- Chapter 6: Emotion, Virtue, and Situationism -- Chapter 7: Our Emotional Cores -- Chapter 8: Emotion and The Fractured Self.
520 $a This book defends the much-disputed view that emotions are what Hume referred to as ‘original existences’: feeling states that have no intentional or representational properties of their own. In doing so, the book serves as a valuable counterbalance to the now mainstream view that emotions are representational mental states. Beginning with a defence of a feeling theory of emotion, Whiting opens up a whole new way of thinking about the role and centrality of emotion in our lives, showing how emotion is key to a proper understanding of human motivation and the self. Whiting establishes that emotions as types of bodily feelings serve as the categorical bases for our behavioural dispositions, including those associated with moral thought, virtue, and vice. The book concludes by advancing the idea that emotions make up our intrinsic nature - the characterisation of what we are like in and of ourselves, when considered apart from how we are disposed to behave. The conclusion additionally draws out the implications of the claims made throughout the book in relation to our understanding of mental illness and the treatment of emotional disorders.
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