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Kant, Wittgenstein, and the Performativity of Thought

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Kant, Wittgenstein, and the Performativity of Thought/ by Aloisia Moser.
作者:	Moser, Aloisia.
面頁冊數:	XV, 158 p.online resource. :
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
標題:	Philosophy of mind. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77550-6
ISBN:	9783030775506

Kant, Wittgenstein, and the Performativity of Thought
Moser, Aloisia.

Kant, Wittgenstein, and the Performativity of Thought[electronic resource] /by Aloisia Moser. - 1st ed. 2021. - XV, 158 p.online resource.

1. Introduction: Kant’s Acts of the Mind and Wittgenstein’s Projection Method -- Part I Kant and the “I Think” as the Facticity of Thought -- 2. A Connection Between Thought and Thing A Priori -- 3. Judging as Connecting Thought and Thing -- 4. Synthesis and Bringing the Manifold of Intuition into an Image -- Part II Wittgenstein’s Picture Theory as a Method of Projection -- 5. The Form of the Proposition -- 6. Projection Method -- 7. Logic Degree Zero -- Part III Kant’s Schematizing and Wittgenstein’s Picturing or Projecting as Performativity -- 8. Kant, Synthesis, and Schema -- 9. Wittgenstein, Meaning, and Use -- 10. Performativity and the Act of Thinking -- 11. Conclusion.

This book explores the idea that there is a certain performativity of thought connecting Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. On this view, we make judgments and use propositions because we presuppose that our thinking is about something, and that our propositions have sense. Kant’s requirement of an a priori connection between intuitions and concepts is akin to Wittgenstein’s idea of the general propositional form as sharing a form with the world. Aloisia Moser argues that Kant speaks about acts of the mind, not about static categories. Furthermore, she elucidates the Tractatus’ logical form as a projection method that turns into a so-called ‘zero method’, whereby propositions are merely the scaffolding of the world. In so doing, Moser connects Kantian reflective judgment to Wittgensteinian rule-following. She thereby presents an account of performativity centering neither on theories nor methods, but on the application enacting them in the first place. Aloisia Moser is Assistant Professor in the Department of the History of Philosophy at the Catholic Private University in Linz, Austria.

ISBN: 9783030775506

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-030-77550-6doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

555804
Philosophy of mind.

LC Class. No.: B53

Dewey Class. No.: 128.2

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