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Rethinking Descartes’s Substance Dualism

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Rethinking Descartes’s Substance Dualism/ by Lynda Gaudemard.
作者:	Gaudemard, Lynda.
面頁冊數:	XI, 152 p. 1 illus.online resource. :
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75414-3
ISBN:	9783030754143

Rethinking Descartes’s Substance Dualism
Gaudemard, Lynda.

Rethinking Descartes’s Substance Dualism[electronic resource] /by Lynda Gaudemard. - 1st ed. 2021. - XI, 152 p. 1 illus.online resource. - Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind,292542-9922 ;. - Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind,10.

Introduction-Why substance dualism is not over -- PART I CHALLENGING THE CARTESIAN MIND PARADIGM (COMPLETED) -- Chapter 1 Descartes’s argument for substance dualism -- Chapter 2 The modal distinction between mind and imagination -- Chapter 3 Imagination as an essential property of the human mind -- PART II THE CARTESIAN HUMAN BODY AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE SELF -- Chapter 4 Notions of emergence -- Chapter 5 Contemporary versions of substance emergent dualism -- Chapter 6 A ‘well disposed’ human body : Descartes’s emergent substance dualism -- Chapter 7 Two kinds of extension -- Conclusion-Descartes’s legacy -- Bibliography -- Index.

This monograph presents an interpretation of Descartes's dualism, which differs from the standard reading called 'classical separatist dualism' claiming that the mind can exist without the body. It argues that, contrary to what it is commonly claimed, Descartes’s texts suggest an emergent creationist substance dualism, according to which the mind is a nonphysical substance (created and maintained by God), which cannot begin to think without a well-disposed body. According to this interpretation, God’s laws of nature endow each human body with the power to be united to an immaterial soul. While the soul does not directly come from the body, the mind can be said to emerge from the body in the sense that it cannot be created by God independently from the body. The divine creation of a human mind requires a well-disposed body, a physical categorical basis. This kind of emergentism is consistent with creationism and does not necessarily entail that the mind cannot survive the body. This early modern view has some connections with Hasker’s substance emergent dualism (1999). Indeed, Hasker states that the mind is a substance emerging at one time from neurons and that consciousness has causal powers which effects cannot be explained by physical neurons. An emergent unified self-existing entity emerges from the brain on which it acts upon. For its proponents, Hasker’s view explains what Descartes’s dualism fails to explain, especially why the mind regularly interacts with one and only one body. After questioning the notion of emergence, the author argues that the theory of emergent creationist substance dualism that she attributes to Descartes is a more appropriate alternative because it faces fewer problems than its rivals. This monograph is valuable for anyone interested in the history of early modern philosophy and contemporary philosophy of mind.

ISBN: 9783030754143

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-030-75414-3doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

559771
Philosophy.

LC Class. No.: B108-5802

Dewey Class. No.: 180-190

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