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The Political Economy of International Agreements = A Collection of Essays /

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The Political Economy of International Agreements/ edited by Florian Kiesow Cortez.
Reminder of title:	A Collection of Essays /
other author:	Kiesow Cortez, Florian.
Description:	VII, 122 p. 1 illus.online resource. :
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
Subject:	Law and economics. -
Online resource:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85194-1
ISBN:	9783030851941

The Political Economy of International Agreements = A Collection of Essays /
The Political Economy of International AgreementsA Collection of Essays /[electronic resource] :edited by Florian Kiesow Cortez. - 1st ed. 2021. - VII, 122 p. 1 illus.online resource. - International Law and Economics,2364-186X. - International Law and Economics,.

Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Domestic Institutions and the Political Economy of International Agreements: A Survey and Hypotheses -- Chapter 3. Domestic Institutions and the Ratification of International Agreements in a Panel of Democracies -- Chapter 4. Choosing to Be Constrained: Electoral Institutions and the Varieties of International Organizations -- Chapter 5. Enforcing International Deals: The System of International Organizations from a Politics-as-Exchange Perspective.

This volume analyzes international agreements from a political economy perspective. In four essays, it raises the question of whether domestic institutions help explain if countries join international agreements, and in case they do, what type of international organization they join. The book examines how specific democratic design elements channel and mediate domestic demands directed at politicians, and how under certain circumstances entering international agreements helps politicians navigate these demands to their benefit. The volume also distinguishes between different types of international instruments with a varying expected constraining effect upon member states, and empirically tests if this matters for incentives to join. The volume addresses scholars, students, and practitioners interested in a better understanding of how the shape of domestic institutions affects politicians’ incentives to enter into binding international agreements.

ISBN: 9783030851941

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-030-85194-1doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

560301
Law and economics.

LC Class. No.: HB73

Dewey Class. No.: 330

The Political Economy of International Agreements = A Collection of Essays /
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