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Breach of Contract = An Economic Analysis of the Efficient Breach Scenario /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Breach of Contract/ by Oliver Hofmann.
其他題名:	An Economic Analysis of the Efficient Breach Scenario /
作者:	Hofmann, Oliver.
面頁冊數:	VII, 268 p. 67 illus., 13 illus. in color.online resource. :
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
標題:	Civil Law. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62525-2
ISBN:	9783030625252

Breach of Contract = An Economic Analysis of the Efficient Breach Scenario /
Hofmann, Oliver.

Breach of ContractAn Economic Analysis of the Efficient Breach Scenario /[electronic resource] :by Oliver Hofmann. - 1st ed. 2021. - VII, 268 p. 67 illus., 13 illus. in color.online resource. - International Law and Economics,2364-186X. - International Law and Economics,.

Introduction -- Breach or Perform Decision – The Traditional Model of the Efficient Breach -- Distributional Effects and the Original Contract -- The Option to Cover -- Over- and Undercompensation -- Incomplete Information -- Transaction Costs -- Conclusion.

“Efficient breach” is one of the most discussed topics in the literature of law and economics. What remedy incentivizes the parties of a contract to perform contracts if and only if it is efficient? This book provides a new perception based on an in-depth analysis of the impact the market structure, asymmetry of information, and deviations from the rational choice model have, comprehensively. The author compares the two predominant remedies for breach of contract which have been adopted by most jurisdictions and also found access to international conventions like the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CiSG): Specific performance and expectation damages. The book illustrates the complexity such a comparison has under more realistic assumptions. The author shows that no simple answer is possible, but one needs to account for the circumstances. The comparison takes an economic approach to law applying game theory. The game-theoretic models are consistent throughout the entire book which makes it easy for the reader to understand what effects different assumptions about the market structure, the distribution of information, and deviations from the rational choice model have, and how they are intertwined.

ISBN: 9783030625252

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-030-62525-2doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

671948
Civil Law.

LC Class. No.: HB73

Dewey Class. No.: 330

Breach of Contract = An Economic Analysis of the Efficient Breach Scenario /
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