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Revisiting Searle on Deriving "Ought" from "Is"

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Revisiting Searle on Deriving "Ought" from "Is"/ edited by Paolo Di Lucia, Edoardo Fittipaldi.
other author:	Di Lucia, Paolo.
Description:	XXVII, 344 p. 2 illus.online resource. :
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
Subject:	Ethics. -
Online resource:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54116-3
ISBN:	9783030541163

Revisiting Searle on Deriving "Ought" from "Is"
Revisiting Searle on Deriving "Ought" from "Is"[electronic resource] /edited by Paolo Di Lucia, Edoardo Fittipaldi. - 1st ed. 2021. - XXVII, 344 p. 2 illus.online resource.

Part 1 -- Chapter 1. How to Derive "Ought" from "Is" Revisited. John R. Searle -- Chapter 2. An Interview with John R. Searle. Paolo Di Lucia & Edoardo Fittipaldi -- Part 2 -- Chapter 3. Is and Ought: Where Does the Problem Lie?. Pedro M.S.Alves -- Chapter 4. Searlean "Is" and "Ought" Revisited. Wojciech Żełaniec -- Chapter 5. Some Remarks on Searle's View on the Logic of Practical Reasoning. Marco Santambrogio -- Chapter 6. On the Regulative Functions of Constitutive Rules. Frederick Schauer -- Chapter 7. Existence as the Source of Normativity: An Alternative to Searle's Way. Roberto De Monticelli -- Chapter 8. How to Derive Is from Ought. Amedo Giovanni Conte -- Chapter 9. Searle vs. Conte on Constitutive Rules. Corrado Roversi -- Chapter 10. "Ought" is Spoken in Many Ways. Paolo Di Lucia -- Chapter 11. Constitutive Rules, Criteria of Validity, and Law. Matthew Grellette -- Chapter 12. Can Constitutive Rules Bridge the Gap Between Is and Ought Statements?. Frank A. Hindriks -- Chapter 13. Searle and Conte on Deriving Ought from Is. Jan Woleński -- Chapter 14. Why Moral Norms Cannot Be Reduced to Facts: On a Trilemma in Derivations of Moral "Ought" from "Is". Wojciech Załuski -- Chapter 15. On Searle's Derivation and its Relation to Constitutive Rules: A Social Scientist's Perspective. Edoardo Fittipaldi. .

"How, you might wonder, can a puzzle first formulated by a young Scotsman-on-the-make some 300 years ago be of interest today? This collection provides a valuable and comprehensive set of answers to this question. It shows why not only Hume, but also Searle, are still of so much importance." – Barry Smith, SUNY Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Julian Park Chair, University of Buffalo, USA This book reconsiders the supposed impossibility of deriving "Ought" from "Is". John R. Searle’s 1964 article How to Derive "Ought " from "Is’’ sent shockwaves through the philosophical community by offering a straightforward counterexample to this claim of impossibility: from your promising something- and this is an "is" - it simply follows that you ‘ought’ to do it. This volume opens with a brand new chapter from Searle who, in light of his subsequent philosophical developments, expounds the reasons for the validity of that derivation and its crucial significance for social ontology and moral philosophy. Then, in a fresh interview with the editors of this volume, Searle explores a range of topics including how his derivation relates to constitutive rules, and how he views Wittgenstein’s philosophy, deontic logic, and the rationality of action. The remainder of the volume is dedicated to a deep dive into Searle’s essay and its implications by international scholars with diverse backgrounds ranging from analytic philosophy, phenomenology, and logic, to moral philosophy and the philosophy and sociology of law. With thirteen original chapters, the contributors provide fresh and timely insights on hotly debated issues: the nature of "Ought"; the logical structure of the social world; and the possibility of deriving not only "Ought" from "Is", but "Is" from "Ought". .

ISBN: 9783030541163

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-030-54116-3doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

555769
Ethics.

LC Class. No.: BJ1-1725

Dewey Class. No.: 170

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