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Options and Agency

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Options and Agency/ by John T. Maier.
作者:	Maier, John T.
面頁冊數:	XXX, 170 p.online resource. :
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
標題:	Philosophy of the Self. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10243-1
ISBN:	9783031102431

Options and Agency
Maier, John T.

Options and Agency[electronic resource] /by John T. Maier. - 1st ed. 2022. - XXX, 170 p.online resource.

1. Foundations -- 2. The Simplicity of Options -- 3. The Analysis of Ability -- 4. The Active and Passive Powers -- 5. A Picture of Agentive Possibility -- 6. Chapter Six: Against Reconciliation -- 7. Simple Compatibilism.

This book develops an original theory of agentive modality: the kind of modality that is distinctive to agents. The central thesis is that the idea of an option should be taken as primitive, and that other agentive notions – such as ability, skill, and free will – should be understood in terms of options. The main contributions of this book are twofold. First, it resolves many of the outstanding questions in the metaphysics and semantics of agentive modality. In doing so, it develops original accounts of topics that have been central to philosophy since Aristotle. It also contributes to a lively contemporary literature on these topics. Second, it articulates an austere and uncompromising form of compatibilism about free will, termed “simple compatibilism.” Simple compatibilism is so-called because it rejects both the reductive theses endorsed by traditional compatibilists and the sophisticated proposals of many contemporary compatibilists. Instead, it turns precisely on insisting that options are analytically simple. Arguments for incompatibilism are shown to rest on auxiliary principles that should, in light of the book’s general account of options, be rejected.

ISBN: 9783031102431

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-031-10243-1doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

1366425
Philosophy of the Self.

LC Class. No.: BD418-418.84

Dewey Class. No.: 128.4

Options and Agency
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