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Biological Naturalism and the Mind-Body Problem

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Biological Naturalism and the Mind-Body Problem/ by Jane Anderson.
作者:	Anderson, Jane.
面頁冊數:	XII, 295 p.online resource. :
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
標題:	Cognitive Neuroscience. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99684-0
ISBN:	9783030996840

Biological Naturalism and the Mind-Body Problem
Anderson, Jane.

Biological Naturalism and the Mind-Body Problem[electronic resource] /by Jane Anderson. - 1st ed. 2022. - XII, 295 p.online resource.

Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. The Explanatory Gap -- Chapter 3. The Hard and The Easy Problems Of Consciousness -- Chapter 4. (Un)consciousness and (Ir)rationality In Psychology -- Chapter 5. The Brain and The Mind-Body-Self -- Chapter 6. 21st Century Biological Naturalism: The Body-Map-Based View and the Affect-Centric View.

This book offers a new theoretical framework within which to understand “the mind-body problem”. The crux of this problem is phenomenal experience, which Thomas Nagel famously described as “what it is like” to be a certain living creature. David Chalmers refers to the problem of “what-it-is-like” as “the hard problem” of consciousness and claims that this problem is so “hard” that investigators have either just ignored the issue completely, investigated a similar (but distinct) problem, or claimed that there is literally nothing to investigate – that phenomenal experience is illusory. This book contends that phenomenal experience is both very real and very important. Two specific “biological naturalist” views are considered in depth. One of these two views, in particular, seems to be free from problems; adopting something along the lines of this view might finally allow us to make sense of the mind-body problem. An essential read for anyone who believes that no satisfactory solution to “the mind-body problem” has yet been discovered.

ISBN: 9783030996840

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-030-99684-0doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

1237796
Cognitive Neuroscience.

LC Class. No.: BD418-418.84

Dewey Class. No.: 128.2

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520 $a This book offers a new theoretical framework within which to understand “the mind-body problem”. The crux of this problem is phenomenal experience, which Thomas Nagel famously described as “what it is like” to be a certain living creature. David Chalmers refers to the problem of “what-it-is-like” as “the hard problem” of consciousness and claims that this problem is so “hard” that investigators have either just ignored the issue completely, investigated a similar (but distinct) problem, or claimed that there is literally nothing to investigate – that phenomenal experience is illusory. This book contends that phenomenal experience is both very real and very important. Two specific “biological naturalist” views are considered in depth. One of these two views, in particular, seems to be free from problems; adopting something along the lines of this view might finally allow us to make sense of the mind-body problem. An essential read for anyone who believes that no satisfactory solution to “the mind-body problem” has yet been discovered.
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