國立虎尾科技大學 |

A theory of legal obligation

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	A theory of legal obligation/ Stefano Bertea.
作者:	Bertea, Stefano.
出版者:	Cambridge :Cambridge University Press, : 2019.,
面頁冊數:	x, 368 p. :ill., digital ; : 24 cm.;
附註:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 04 Oct 2019).
標題:	Obligations (Law) - Philosophy. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108566216
ISBN:	9781108566216

A theory of legal obligation
Bertea, Stefano.

A theory of legal obligation[electronic resource] /Stefano Bertea. - Cambridge :Cambridge University Press,2019. - x, 368 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 04 Oct 2019).

Introduction -- The Concept of Obligation -- Contemporary Approaches to Legal Obligations : A Preliminary Map -- The Social-Practice Account -- The Interpretivist Account -- The Conventionalist Reason Account -- The Exclusionary Reason Account -- A Revisionary Kantian Conception -- Further Dimensions of the Revisionary Kantian Conception -- The Robust Reason Account -- The Method of Presuppositional Interpretation -- Conclusion.

The focus of this monograph lies in the construction of a theory of legal obligation, understanding it as a discrete notion with its own defining traits. In this work, Bertea specifically addresses the question: how should legal obligation be distinctively conceptualized? The conceptualization of legal obligation he defends in this work gradually emerges from a critical assessment of the theories of legal obligation that have been most influential in the contemporary legal-theoretical debate. Building on such critical analysis, Bertea's study purports to offer a novel and unconventional conceptualization of legal obligation, which is characterized as a law-engendered intersubjective reason for carrying out certain courses of conduct.

ISBN: 9781108566216Subjects--Topical Terms:

1426824
Obligations (Law)
--Philosophy.

LC Class. No.: K230.B475

Dewey Class. No.: 340.112

A theory of legal obligation
LDR:02004nam a2200265 a 4500 001 1114125
003 UkCbUP
005 20191007140237.0
006 m d
007 cr nn 008maaau
008 231225s2019 enk o 1 0 eng d
020 $a 9781108566216 $q (electronic bk.)
020 $a 9781108475105 $q (hardback)
020 $a 9781108465878 $q (paperback)
035 $a CR9781108566216
040 $a UkCbUP $b eng $c UkCbUP $d GP
050 0 0 $a K230.B475
082 0 0 $a 340.112 $2 23
090 $a K230.B475 $b B537 2019
100 1 $a Bertea, Stefano. $3 1426823
245 1 2 $a A theory of legal obligation $h [electronic resource] / $c Stefano Bertea.
260 $a Cambridge : $b Cambridge University Press, $c 2019.
300 $a x, 368 p. : $b ill., digital ; $c 24 cm.
500 $a Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 04 Oct 2019).
505 0 $a Introduction -- The Concept of Obligation -- Contemporary Approaches to Legal Obligations : A Preliminary Map -- The Social-Practice Account -- The Interpretivist Account -- The Conventionalist Reason Account -- The Exclusionary Reason Account -- A Revisionary Kantian Conception -- Further Dimensions of the Revisionary Kantian Conception -- The Robust Reason Account -- The Method of Presuppositional Interpretation -- Conclusion.
520 $a The focus of this monograph lies in the construction of a theory of legal obligation, understanding it as a discrete notion with its own defining traits. In this work, Bertea specifically addresses the question: how should legal obligation be distinctively conceptualized? The conceptualization of legal obligation he defends in this work gradually emerges from a critical assessment of the theories of legal obligation that have been most influential in the contemporary legal-theoretical debate. Building on such critical analysis, Bertea's study purports to offer a novel and unconventional conceptualization of legal obligation, which is characterized as a law-engendered intersubjective reason for carrying out certain courses of conduct.
650 0 $a Obligations (Law) $x Philosophy. $3 1426824
650 0 $a Law $x Philosophy. $3 556912
856 4 0 $u https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108566216