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Moral disagreement /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Moral disagreement // Folke Tersman.
作者:	Tersman, Folke,
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (xvii, 141 pages) :digital, PDF file(s). :
附註:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
標題:	Ethics. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511570599
ISBN:	9780511570599 (ebook)

Moral disagreement /
Tersman, Folke,

Moral disagreement /Folke Tersman. - 1 online resource (xvii, 141 pages) :digital, PDF file(s). - Cambridge studies in philosophy. - Cambridge studies in philosophy..

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Realism and irrealism -- The case for radical moral disagreement -- Explaining and predicting disagreement -- The argument from inaccessibility -- The argument from ambiguity -- Attributing moral judgments.

Folke Tersman explores what we can learn about the nature of moral thinking by examining moral disagreement. He explains how diversity of opinion on moral issues undermines the idea that moral convictions can be objectively valued. Arguments on moral thinking are often criticized for not being able to explain why there is a contrast between ethics and other areas in which there is disagreement, but where one does not give up the idea of an objective truth, as in the natural sciences. Tersman shows that the contrast has to do with facts about when, and on what basis, moral convictions can be correctly attributed to an agent or speaker.

ISBN: 9780511570599 (ebook)Subjects--Topical Terms:

555769
Ethics.

LC Class. No.: BJ1031 / .T47 2006

Dewey Class. No.: 170/.42

Moral disagreement /
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