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Hamilton's paradox : = the promise and peril of fiscal federalism /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Hamilton's paradox :/ Jonathan A. Rodden.
其他題名:	the promise and peril of fiscal federalism /
作者:	Rodden, Jonathan,
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (xvi, 313 pages) :digital, PDF file(s). :
附註:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
標題:	Revenue sharing. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511616075
ISBN:	9780511616075 (ebook)

Hamilton's paradox : = the promise and peril of fiscal federalism /
Rodden, Jonathan,

Hamilton's paradox :the promise and peril of fiscal federalism /Jonathan A. Rodden. - 1 online resource (xvi, 313 pages) :digital, PDF file(s). - Cambridge studies in comparative politics. - Cambridge studies in comparative politics..

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Introduction and overview -- Promise and peril : intellectual history -- Sovereignty and commitment -- The power of the purse : intergovernmental grants and fiscal discipline -- Disease or cure? : political parties and fiscal discipline -- An approach to comparative case studies -- Fiscal federalism and bailouts in postwar Germany -- The crisis of fiscal federalism in Brazil -- The challenge of reform in federations -- The origins of subnational sovereignty -- Conclusions.

As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. A key question is whether a politically-motivated central government can credibly commit not to bail out subnational governments in times of crisis if it funds most of their expenditures. The center can commit when subnational governments retain significant tax autonomy, as in the United States. Or if the center dominates taxation, it can tightly regulate borrowing, as in many unitary systems. In a third group of countries including Brazil and Germany, the center can neither commit to a system of market-based discipline nor gain a monopoly over borrowing. By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and historical and contemporary case studies, this book explains why different countries have had dramatically different experiences with subnational fiscal discipline.

ISBN: 9780511616075 (ebook)Subjects--Topical Terms:

1439134
Revenue sharing.

LC Class. No.: HJ197 / .R63 2006

Dewey Class. No.: 336.1/85

Hamilton's paradox : = the promise and peril of fiscal federalism /
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520 $a As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. A key question is whether a politically-motivated central government can credibly commit not to bail out subnational governments in times of crisis if it funds most of their expenditures. The center can commit when subnational governments retain significant tax autonomy, as in the United States. Or if the center dominates taxation, it can tightly regulate borrowing, as in many unitary systems. In a third group of countries including Brazil and Germany, the center can neither commit to a system of market-based discipline nor gain a monopoly over borrowing. By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and historical and contemporary case studies, this book explains why different countries have had dramatically different experiences with subnational fiscal discipline.
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