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Putting skeptics in their place : = the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry /

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Putting skeptics in their place :/ John Greco.
Reminder of title:	the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry /
Author:	Greco, John,
Description:	1 online resource (xvi, 264 pages) :digital, PDF file(s). :
Notes:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
Subject:	Skepticism. -
Online resource:	https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511527418
ISBN:	9780511527418 (ebook)

Putting skeptics in their place : = the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry /
Greco, John,

Putting skeptics in their place :the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry /John Greco. - 1 online resource (xvi, 264 pages) :digital, PDF file(s). - Cambridge studies in philosophy. - Cambridge studies in philosophy..

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry --1.

This book, first published in 2000, is about the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry. John Greco delineates three main theses: that a number of historically prominent skeptical arguments make no obvious mistake, and therefore cannot be easily dismissed; that the analysis of skeptical arguments is philosophically useful and important, and should therefore have a central place in the methodology of philosophy; and that taking skeptical arguments seriously requires us to adopt an externalist, reliabilist epistemology. Greco argues that the importance of skeptical arguments is methodological. It is further argued that taking skeptical arguments seriously requires us to adopt a version of 'virtue epistemology', or a theory of knowledge that makes intellectual virtue central in the analysis of knowledge. The above methodology has consequences for moral and religious epistemology; in particular, a theory of moral perception is defended.

ISBN: 9780511527418 (ebook)Subjects--Topical Terms:

575754
Skepticism.

LC Class. No.: B837 / .G74 2000

Dewey Class. No.: 149/.73

Putting skeptics in their place : = the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry /
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505 0 0 $g 1. $t The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry -- $g 2. $t Skepticism about the World: Part One -- Reconstructions -- $g 3. $t Skepticism about the World: Part Two -- Dismissive Responses -- $g 4. $t Skepticism about the World: Part Three -- Dualism, Realism, and Representationalism -- $g 5. $t The Argument from an Infinite Regress of Reasons -- $g 6. $t Hume's Skepticism about Unobserved Matters of Fact -- $g 7. $t Agent Reliabilism -- $g 8. $t Agent Reliabilism and the Relevant Sense of "Relevant Possibility" -- $g 9. $t Moral and Religious Epistemology.
520 $a This book, first published in 2000, is about the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry. John Greco delineates three main theses: that a number of historically prominent skeptical arguments make no obvious mistake, and therefore cannot be easily dismissed; that the analysis of skeptical arguments is philosophically useful and important, and should therefore have a central place in the methodology of philosophy; and that taking skeptical arguments seriously requires us to adopt an externalist, reliabilist epistemology. Greco argues that the importance of skeptical arguments is methodological. It is further argued that taking skeptical arguments seriously requires us to adopt a version of 'virtue epistemology', or a theory of knowledge that makes intellectual virtue central in the analysis of knowledge. The above methodology has consequences for moral and religious epistemology; in particular, a theory of moral perception is defended.
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