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Brute rationality : = normativity and human action /

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Brute rationality :/ Joshua Gert.
Reminder of title:	normativity and human action /
Author:	Gert, Joshua,
Description:	1 online resource (xiii, 230 pages) :digital, PDF file(s). :
Notes:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
Subject:	Normativity (Ethics) -
Online resource:	https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487088
ISBN:	9780511487088 (ebook)

Brute rationality : = normativity and human action /
Gert, Joshua,

Brute rationality :normativity and human action /Joshua Gert. - 1 online resource (xiii, 230 pages) :digital, PDF file(s). - Cambridge studies in philosophy. - Cambridge studies in philosophy..

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

What would an adequate theory of rationality be like? -- Practical rationality, morality, and purely justificatory reasons -- The criticism from internalism about practical reasons -- A functional role analysis of reasons -- Accounting for our actual normative judgments -- Fitting the view into the contemporary debate -- Two concepts of rationality -- Internalism and different kinds of reasons -- Brute rationality.

This book presents an account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Rather than simply 'counting in favour of' actions, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. The distinction between these two roles explains why some reasons do not seem relevant to the rational status of an action unless the agent cares about them, while other reasons retain all their force regardless of the agent's attitude. It also explains why the class of rationally permissible action is wide enough to contain not only all morally required action, but also much selfish and immoral action. The book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reason in particular, and moral theory more generally.

ISBN: 9780511487088 (ebook)Subjects--Topical Terms:

592353
Normativity (Ethics)

LC Class. No.: BJ1458.3 / .G47 2004

Dewey Class. No.: 128/.4

Brute rationality : = normativity and human action /
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505 0 $a What would an adequate theory of rationality be like? -- Practical rationality, morality, and purely justificatory reasons -- The criticism from internalism about practical reasons -- A functional role analysis of reasons -- Accounting for our actual normative judgments -- Fitting the view into the contemporary debate -- Two concepts of rationality -- Internalism and different kinds of reasons -- Brute rationality.
520 $a This book presents an account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Rather than simply 'counting in favour of' actions, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. The distinction between these two roles explains why some reasons do not seem relevant to the rational status of an action unless the agent cares about them, while other reasons retain all their force regardless of the agent's attitude. It also explains why the class of rationally permissible action is wide enough to contain not only all morally required action, but also much selfish and immoral action. The book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reason in particular, and moral theory more generally.
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