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Ambition, federalism, and legislative politics in Brazil /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Ambition, federalism, and legislative politics in Brazil // David Samuels.
其他題名:	Ambition, Federalism, & Legislative Politics in Brazil
作者:	Samuels, David,
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (xvi, 248 pages) :digital, PDF file(s). :
附註:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
標題:	Rational choice theory. -
標題:	Brazil - Description and travel. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510366
ISBN:	9780511510366 (ebook)

Ambition, federalism, and legislative politics in Brazil /
Samuels, David,1967-

Ambition, federalism, and legislative politics in Brazil /Ambition, Federalism, & Legislative Politics in BrazilDavid Samuels. - 1 online resource (xvi, 248 pages) :digital, PDF file(s).

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Part I. Section I: 1. Ambition theory and political careers in Brazil -- 2. In the absence of congressional careerism: short stints, flat hierarchies, and low payoffs in the brazilian chamber of deputies -- 3. Progressive ambition and congressional 'hot seats' in Brazil, 1945-98 -- 4. Labyrinths of power, Brazilian-style: post-chamber political careers -- Part II. Section II: 6. On the political (in)efficacy of pork-barreling in the Brazilian congress -- 7. Progressive ambition, federalism, and pork-barreling in Brazil -- 8. Institutions of their own design? democratization and fiscal decentralization in Brazil, 1975-95 -- 9. The Cardoso administration and changes in Brazilian federalism.

Ambition theory suggests that scholars can understand a good deal about politics by exploring politicians' career goals. In the USA, an enormous literature explains congressional politics by assuming that politicians primarily desire to win re-election. In contrast, although Brazil's institutions appear to encourage incumbency, politicians do not seek to build a career within the legislature. Instead, political ambition focuses on the subnational level. Even while serving in the legislature, Brazilian legislators act strategically to further their future extra-legislative careers by serving as 'ambassadors' of subnational governments. Brazil's federal institutions also affect politicians' electoral prospects and career goals, heightening the importance of subnational interests in the lower chamber of the national legislature. Together, ambition and federalism help explain important dynamics of executive-legislative relations in Brazil. This book's rational-choice institutionalist perspective contributes to the literature on the importance of federalism and subnational politics to understanding national-level politics around the world.

ISBN: 9780511510366 (ebook)Subjects--Topical Terms:

559807
Rational choice theory.
Subjects--Geographical Terms:

797851
Brazil
--Description and travel.

LC Class. No.: JL2420.S8 / S26 2003

Dewey Class. No.: 320.981

Ambition, federalism, and legislative politics in Brazil /
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520 $a Ambition theory suggests that scholars can understand a good deal about politics by exploring politicians' career goals. In the USA, an enormous literature explains congressional politics by assuming that politicians primarily desire to win re-election. In contrast, although Brazil's institutions appear to encourage incumbency, politicians do not seek to build a career within the legislature. Instead, political ambition focuses on the subnational level. Even while serving in the legislature, Brazilian legislators act strategically to further their future extra-legislative careers by serving as 'ambassadors' of subnational governments. Brazil's federal institutions also affect politicians' electoral prospects and career goals, heightening the importance of subnational interests in the lower chamber of the national legislature. Together, ambition and federalism help explain important dynamics of executive-legislative relations in Brazil. This book's rational-choice institutionalist perspective contributes to the literature on the importance of federalism and subnational politics to understanding national-level politics around the world.
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