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Putting trust in the US budget : = federal trust funds and the politics of commitment /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Putting trust in the US budget :/ Eric M. Patashnik.
其他題名:	federal trust funds and the politics of commitment /
作者:	Patashnik, Eric M.,
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (xiv, 231 pages) :digital, PDF file(s). :
附註:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
標題:	Budget - United States. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511490842
ISBN:	9780511490842 (ebook)

Putting trust in the US budget : = federal trust funds and the politics of commitment /
Patashnik, Eric M.,

Putting trust in the US budget :federal trust funds and the politics of commitment /Eric M. Patashnik. - 1 online resource (xiv, 231 pages) :digital, PDF file(s). - Theories of institutional design. - Theories of institutional design..

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Introduction: trust funds and the politics of commitment -- Political transaction costs, feedback effects, and policy credibility -- Trust fund taxes vs. general fund taxes -- Social security -- Medicare -- Highways -- Airports -- Superfund -- Barriers to trust fund adoption: the failed cases of energy security and lead abatement -- Conclusions: The structure and normative challenge of promise-keeping.

In the United States many important programs are paid from trust funds. At a time when major social insurance funds are facing insolvency, this book provided the first comprehensive study of this significant yet little-studied feature of the American welfare state. Equally importantly, the author investigates an enduring issue in democratic politics: can current officeholders bind their successors? By law, trust funds, which get most of their money from earmarked taxes, are restricted for specific uses. Patashnik asks why these structures were created, and how they have affected political dynamics. He argues that officeholders have used trust funds primarily to reduce political uncertainty, and bind distant futures. Based on detailed case studies of trust funds in a number of policy sectors, he shows how political commitment is a developmental process, whereby precommitments shape the content of future political conflicts. This book will be of interest to students of public policy, political economy and American political development.

ISBN: 9780511490842 (ebook)Subjects--Topical Terms:

657827
Budget
--United States.

LC Class. No.: HD7105.45.U6 / P366 2000

Dewey Class. No.: 336.73

Putting trust in the US budget : = federal trust funds and the politics of commitment /
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