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Practical rules : = when we need them and when we don't /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Practical rules :/ Alan H. Goldman.
其他題名:	when we need them and when we don't /
作者:	Goldman, Alan H.,
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (xi, 210 pages) :digital, PDF file(s). :
附註:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
標題:	Rules (Philosophy) -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498787
ISBN:	9780511498787 (ebook)

Practical rules : = when we need them and when we don't /
Goldman, Alan H.,1945-

Practical rules :when we need them and when we don't /Alan H. Goldman. - 1 online resource (xi, 210 pages) :digital, PDF file(s). - Cambridge studies in philosophy. - Cambridge studies in philosophy..

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

1. Moral Rules -- I. Outline of the Task -- II. Types of Rules: Dispensable and Indispensable -- III. Ordinary Moral Consciousness -- IV. Rules as Second-Best Strategies -- V. The Justification of Rules: Strong and Weak -- VI. Interpretation of Weak Rules -- 2. Prudential Rules -- I. Moral and Prudential Rules Compared -- II. Second-Order Prudential Rules: Optimizing -- III. A Prudential Rule to Be Moral -- 3. Legal Rules -- I. Classification -- II. The Descriptive Question: Hart, Dworkin, and Others -- III. The Descriptive Question: Sources of Law -- IV. The Normative Question -- 4. Moral Reasoning without Rules -- I. The Inadequacy of Particularism -- II. Coherence -- III. The Reasoning Process Reviewed -- IV. Objections.

Rules proliferate; some are kept with a bureaucratic stringency bordering on the absurd, while others are manipulated and ignored in ways that injure our sense of justice. Under what conditions should we make exceptions to rules, and when should they be followed despite particular circumstances? The two dominant models in the literature on rules are the particularist account and that which sees the application of rules as normative. Taking a position that falls between these two extremes, Alan Goldman provides a systematic framework to clarify when we need to follow rules in our moral, legal and prudential decisions, and when we ought not to do so. The book distinguishes among various types of rules; it illuminates concepts such as integrity, self-interest and self-deception; and finally, it provides an account of ordinary moral reasoning without rules. This book will be of great interest to advanced students and professionals working in philosophy, law, decision theory and the social sciences.

ISBN: 9780511498787 (ebook)Subjects--Topical Terms:

557222
Rules (Philosophy)

LC Class. No.: BJ1031 / .G67 2001

Dewey Class. No.: 170/.42

Practical rules : = when we need them and when we don't /
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505 0 $a 1. Moral Rules -- I. Outline of the Task -- II. Types of Rules: Dispensable and Indispensable -- III. Ordinary Moral Consciousness -- IV. Rules as Second-Best Strategies -- V. The Justification of Rules: Strong and Weak -- VI. Interpretation of Weak Rules -- 2. Prudential Rules -- I. Moral and Prudential Rules Compared -- II. Second-Order Prudential Rules: Optimizing -- III. A Prudential Rule to Be Moral -- 3. Legal Rules -- I. Classification -- II. The Descriptive Question: Hart, Dworkin, and Others -- III. The Descriptive Question: Sources of Law -- IV. The Normative Question -- 4. Moral Reasoning without Rules -- I. The Inadequacy of Particularism -- II. Coherence -- III. The Reasoning Process Reviewed -- IV. Objections.
520 $a Rules proliferate; some are kept with a bureaucratic stringency bordering on the absurd, while others are manipulated and ignored in ways that injure our sense of justice. Under what conditions should we make exceptions to rules, and when should they be followed despite particular circumstances? The two dominant models in the literature on rules are the particularist account and that which sees the application of rules as normative. Taking a position that falls between these two extremes, Alan Goldman provides a systematic framework to clarify when we need to follow rules in our moral, legal and prudential decisions, and when we ought not to do so. The book distinguishes among various types of rules; it illuminates concepts such as integrity, self-interest and self-deception; and finally, it provides an account of ordinary moral reasoning without rules. This book will be of great interest to advanced students and professionals working in philosophy, law, decision theory and the social sciences.
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