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The institutional economics of corruption and reform : = theory, evidence, and policy /

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The institutional economics of corruption and reform :/ Johann Graf Lambsdorff.
Reminder of title:	theory, evidence, and policy /
remainder title:	The Institutional Economics of Corruption & Reform
Author:	Lambsdorff, Johann,
Description:	1 online resource (xiv, 286 pages) :digital, PDF file(s). :
Notes:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
Subject:	Administrative agencies - Corrupt practices -
Online resource:	https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511492617
ISBN:	9780511492617 (ebook)

The institutional economics of corruption and reform : = theory, evidence, and policy /
Lambsdorff, Johann,Graf,1965-

The institutional economics of corruption and reform :theory, evidence, and policy /The Institutional Economics of Corruption & ReformJohann Graf Lambsdorff. - 1 online resource (xiv, 286 pages) :digital, PDF file(s).

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Enemies of corruption -- What is bad about bureaucratic corruption? An institutional economic approach -- The dilemma of the kleptocrat: What is bad about political corruption? -- Corruption and transactions costs: the rent-seeking perspective -- Making corrupt deals: contracting in the shadow of the law -- Exporters' ethics and the art of bribery -- How confidence facilitates illegal transactions: an empirical approach -- Corrupt relational contracting.

Corruption has been a feature of public institutions for centuries yet only relatively recently has it been made the subject of sustained scientific analysis. Lambsdorff shows how insights from institutional economics can be used to develop a better understanding of why corruption occurs and the best policies to combat it. He argues that rather than being deterred by penalties, corrupt actors are more influenced by other factors such as the opportunism of their criminal counterparts and the danger of acquiring an unreliable reputation. This suggests a novel strategy for fighting corruption similar to the invisible hand that governs competitive markets. This strategy - the 'invisible foot' - shows that the unreliability of corrupt counterparts induces honesty and good governance even in the absence of good intentions. Combining theoretical research with state-of-the-art empirical investigations, this book will be an invaluable resource for researchers and policy-makers concerned with anti-corruption reform.

ISBN: 9780511492617 (ebook)Subjects--Topical Terms:

1135691
Administrative agencies
--Corrupt practices

LC Class. No.: JF1525.C66 / L36 2007

Dewey Class. No.: 353.4/6

The institutional economics of corruption and reform : = theory, evidence, and policy /
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245 1 4 $a The institutional economics of corruption and reform : $b theory, evidence, and policy / $c Johann Graf Lambsdorff.
246 3 $a The Institutional Economics of Corruption & Reform
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500 $a Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
505 0 $a Enemies of corruption -- What is bad about bureaucratic corruption? An institutional economic approach -- The dilemma of the kleptocrat: What is bad about political corruption? -- Corruption and transactions costs: the rent-seeking perspective -- Making corrupt deals: contracting in the shadow of the law -- Exporters' ethics and the art of bribery -- How confidence facilitates illegal transactions: an empirical approach -- Corrupt relational contracting.
520 $a Corruption has been a feature of public institutions for centuries yet only relatively recently has it been made the subject of sustained scientific analysis. Lambsdorff shows how insights from institutional economics can be used to develop a better understanding of why corruption occurs and the best policies to combat it. He argues that rather than being deterred by penalties, corrupt actors are more influenced by other factors such as the opportunism of their criminal counterparts and the danger of acquiring an unreliable reputation. This suggests a novel strategy for fighting corruption similar to the invisible hand that governs competitive markets. This strategy - the 'invisible foot' - shows that the unreliability of corrupt counterparts induces honesty and good governance even in the absence of good intentions. Combining theoretical research with state-of-the-art empirical investigations, this book will be an invaluable resource for researchers and policy-makers concerned with anti-corruption reform.
650 0 $a Administrative agencies $x Corrupt practices $x Prevention. $3 1135691
650 0 $a Political corruption $x Prevention. $3 940828
650 0 $a International finance $x Corrupt practices $x Prevention. $3 1444947
650 0 $a Institutional economics $x Sociological aspects. $3 1444948
776 0 8 $i Print version: $z 9780521872751
856 4 0 $u https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511492617