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Setting the agenda : = responsible party government in the U.S. House of Representatives /

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Setting the agenda :/ Gary W. Cox, Mathew D. McCubbins.
Reminder of title:	responsible party government in the U.S. House of Representatives /
Author:	Cox, Gary W.,
other author:	McCubbins, Mathew D.
Description:	1 online resource (xii, 336 pages) :digital, PDF file(s). :
Notes:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
Subject:	Political parties - United States. -
Online resource:	https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511791123
ISBN:	9780511791123 (ebook)

Setting the agenda : = responsible party government in the U.S. House of Representatives /
Cox, Gary W.,

Setting the agenda :responsible party government in the U.S. House of Representatives /Gary W. Cox, Mathew D. McCubbins. - 1 online resource (xii, 336 pages) :digital, PDF file(s).

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Introduction -- Procedural cartel theory -- Modeling agenda power -- The primacy of Reed's rules in House organization -- Final passage votes -- The costs of agenda control -- The textbook Congress and the Committee on Rules -- The bills reported from committee -- Which way does policy move? -- Positive agenda power -- Conclusion.

Scholars of the U.S. House disagree over the importance of political parties in organizing the legislative process. On the one hand, non-partisan theories stress how congressional organization serves members' non-partisan goals. On the other hand, partisan theories argue that the House is organized to serve the collective interests of the majority party. This book advances our partisan theory and presents a series of empirical tests of that theory's predictions (pitted against others). It considers why procedural cartels form, arguing that agenda power is naturally subject to cartelization in busy legislatures. It argues that the majority party has cartelized agenda power in the U.S. House since the adoption of Reed's rules in 1890. The evidence demonstrates that the majority party seizes agenda control at nearly every stage of the legislative process in order to prevent bills that the party dislikes from reaching the floor.

ISBN: 9780511791123 (ebook)Subjects--Corporate Names:

1445277
United States.
Congress.Subjects--Topical Terms:

565443
Political parties
--United States.

LC Class. No.: JK1410 / .C695 2005

Dewey Class. No.: 328.73/072

Setting the agenda : = responsible party government in the U.S. House of Representatives /
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505 0 $a Introduction -- Procedural cartel theory -- Modeling agenda power -- The primacy of Reed's rules in House organization -- Final passage votes -- The costs of agenda control -- The textbook Congress and the Committee on Rules -- The bills reported from committee -- Which way does policy move? -- Positive agenda power -- Conclusion.
520 $a Scholars of the U.S. House disagree over the importance of political parties in organizing the legislative process. On the one hand, non-partisan theories stress how congressional organization serves members' non-partisan goals. On the other hand, partisan theories argue that the House is organized to serve the collective interests of the majority party. This book advances our partisan theory and presents a series of empirical tests of that theory's predictions (pitted against others). It considers why procedural cartels form, arguing that agenda power is naturally subject to cartelization in busy legislatures. It argues that the majority party has cartelized agenda power in the U.S. House since the adoption of Reed's rules in 1890. The evidence demonstrates that the majority party seizes agenda control at nearly every stage of the legislative process in order to prevent bills that the party dislikes from reaching the floor.
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