國立虎尾科技大學 |

Architects of political change : = constitutional quandaries and social choice theory /

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Architects of political change :/ Norman Schofield.
Reminder of title:	constitutional quandaries and social choice theory /
Author:	Schofield, Norman,
Description:	1 online resource (xiv, 317 pages) :digital, PDF file(s). :
Notes:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
Subject:	Political science - Economic aspects. -
Subject:	United States - Defenses -
Online resource:	https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511606892
ISBN:	9780511606892 (ebook)

Architects of political change : = constitutional quandaries and social choice theory /
Schofield, Norman,1944-

Architects of political change :constitutional quandaries and social choice theory /Norman Schofield. - 1 online resource (xiv, 317 pages) :digital, PDF file(s). - Political economy of institutions and decisions. - Political economy of institutions and decisions..

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Constitutional quandaries and social choice -- Power and social choice -- Franklin and the War of Independence -- Madison, Jefferson, and Condorcet -- Lincoln and the Civil War -- Johnson and the critical realignment of 1964 -- Keynes and the Atlantic constitution -- Preferences and beliefs -- Political change.

This work offers a set of extended interpretations of Madison's argument in Federalist X of 1787, using ideas from social choice theory and from the work of Douglass North, Mancur Olson, and William Riker. Its focus is not on rational choice theory itself, but on the use of this theory as a heuristic device to better understand democratic institutions. The treatment adapts a formal model of elections to consider rapid constitutional change at periods when societies face quandaries. The topics explored in the book include Britain's reorganization of its fiscal system in the eighteenth century to prosecute its wars with France; the Colonies' decision to declare independence in 1776; Madison's argument about the 'probability of fit choice' during the Ratification period of 1787-88; the argument between Hamilton and Jefferson in 1798-1800 over the long run organization of the US economy and the election of Lincoln in 1860.

ISBN: 9780511606892 (ebook)Subjects--Topical Terms:

1444510
Political science
--Economic aspects.Subjects--Geographical Terms:

528513
United States
--Defenses

LC Class. No.: JA77 / .S37 2006

Dewey Class. No.: 320.97301

Architects of political change : = constitutional quandaries and social choice theory /
LDR:02383nam a2200325 i 4500 001 1127173
003 UkCbUP
005 20151005020621.0
006 m|||||o||d||||||||
007 cr||||||||||||
008 240926s2006||||enk o ||1 0|eng|d
020 $a 9780511606892 (ebook)
020 $z 9780521832021 (hardback)
020 $z 9780521539722 (paperback)
035 $a CR9780511606892
040 $a UkCbUP $b eng $e rda $c UkCbUP
043 $a n-us---
050 0 0 $a JA77 $b .S37 2006
082 0 0 $a 320.97301 $2 22
100 1 $a Schofield, Norman, $d 1944- $3 866883
245 1 0 $a Architects of political change : $b constitutional quandaries and social choice theory / $c Norman Schofield.
264 1 $a Cambridge : $b Cambridge University Press, $c 2006.
300 $a 1 online resource (xiv, 317 pages) : $b digital, PDF file(s).
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
490 1 $a Political economy of institutions and decisions
500 $a Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
505 0 $a Constitutional quandaries and social choice -- Power and social choice -- Franklin and the War of Independence -- Madison, Jefferson, and Condorcet -- Lincoln and the Civil War -- Johnson and the critical realignment of 1964 -- Keynes and the Atlantic constitution -- Preferences and beliefs -- Political change.
520 $a This work offers a set of extended interpretations of Madison's argument in Federalist X of 1787, using ideas from social choice theory and from the work of Douglass North, Mancur Olson, and William Riker. Its focus is not on rational choice theory itself, but on the use of this theory as a heuristic device to better understand democratic institutions. The treatment adapts a formal model of elections to consider rapid constitutional change at periods when societies face quandaries. The topics explored in the book include Britain's reorganization of its fiscal system in the eighteenth century to prosecute its wars with France; the Colonies' decision to declare independence in 1776; Madison's argument about the 'probability of fit choice' during the Ratification period of 1787-88; the argument between Hamilton and Jefferson in 1798-1800 over the long run organization of the US economy and the election of Lincoln in 1860.
650 0 $a Political science $x Economic aspects. $3 1444510
650 0 $a Social choice $x Political aspects. $3 1156654
650 0 $a Constitutional history $z United States. $3 571626
650 0 $a Elections $x Mathematical models. $3 528235
651 0 $a United States $x Defenses $x Mathematical models. $3 528513
776 0 8 $i Print version: $z 9780521832021
830 0 $a Political economy of institutions and decisions. $3 1156653
856 4 0 $u https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511606892