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Veto bargaining : = presidents and the politics of negative power /

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Veto bargaining :/ Charles M. Cameron.
Reminder of title:	presidents and the politics of negative power /
Author:	Cameron, Charles M.
Description:	1 online resource (xvi, 292 pages) :digital, PDF file(s). :
Notes:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
Subject:	Veto - United States. -
Subject:	United States - Defenses -
Online resource:	https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511613302
ISBN:	9780511613302 (ebook)

Veto bargaining : = presidents and the politics of negative power /
Cameron, Charles M.1954-

Veto bargaining :presidents and the politics of negative power /Charles M. Cameron. - 1 online resource (xvi, 292 pages) :digital, PDF file(s). - Political economy of institutions and decisions. - Political economy of institutions and decisions..

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

The late-twentieth century has given rise to the most concentrated period of divided party government in American history. With one party controlling the presidency and the opposing party controlling Congress, the veto has inevitably become a critical tool of presidential power. Combining sophisticated game theory with unprecedented data, this book analyzes how divided party presidents use threats and vetoes to wrest policy concessions from a hostile Congress. Case studies of the most important vetoes in recent history add texture to the analysis, detailing how President Clinton altered the course of Newt Gingrich's Republican Revolution. Offering the first book-length analysis to bring rational choice theory to bear on the presidency, Veto Bargaining offers a major contribution to our understanding of American politics in an age of divided party government.

ISBN: 9780511613302 (ebook)Subjects--Topical Terms:

799954
Veto
--United States.Subjects--Geographical Terms:

528513
United States
--Defenses

LC Class. No.: JK586 / .C23 2000

Dewey Class. No.: 352.23/0973

Veto bargaining : = presidents and the politics of negative power /
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500 $a Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
520 $a The late-twentieth century has given rise to the most concentrated period of divided party government in American history. With one party controlling the presidency and the opposing party controlling Congress, the veto has inevitably become a critical tool of presidential power. Combining sophisticated game theory with unprecedented data, this book analyzes how divided party presidents use threats and vetoes to wrest policy concessions from a hostile Congress. Case studies of the most important vetoes in recent history add texture to the analysis, detailing how President Clinton altered the course of Newt Gingrich's Republican Revolution. Offering the first book-length analysis to bring rational choice theory to bear on the presidency, Veto Bargaining offers a major contribution to our understanding of American politics in an age of divided party government.
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