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Voting for policy, not parties : = how voters compensate for power sharing /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Voting for policy, not parties :/ Orit Kedar.
其他題名:	how voters compensate for power sharing /
作者:	Kedar, Orit,
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (xiv, 220 pages) :digital, PDF file(s). :
附註:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
標題:	Comparative government. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511657481
ISBN:	9780511657481 (ebook)

Voting for policy, not parties : = how voters compensate for power sharing /
Kedar, Orit,

Voting for policy, not parties :how voters compensate for power sharing /Orit Kedar. - 1 online resource (xiv, 220 pages) :digital, PDF file(s). - Cambridge studies in comparative politics. - Cambridge studies in comparative politics..

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Voting for policy. Introduction: institutional sources of voter choice ; A theory of compensatory vote -- Empirical evidence: how voters compensate for diffusion of power. Compensatory vote in parliamentary democracies ; Balancing strong (and weak) presidents ; Compensatory vote in federations: evidence from Germany -- Theoretical implications.

This book proposes an institutionally embedded framework for analyzing voter choice. Voters, Orit Kedar argues, are concerned with policy, and therefore their vote reflects the path set by political institutions leading from votes to policy. Under this framework, the more institutional mechanisms facilitating post-electoral compromise are built into the political process (e.g., multi-party government), the more voters compensate for the dilution of their vote. This simple but overlooked principle allows Kedar to explain a broad array of seemingly unrelated electoral regularities and offer a unified framework of analysis, which she terms compensatory vote. Kedar develops the compensatory logic in three electoral arenas: parliamentary, presidential, and federal. Leveraging on institutional variation in the degree of power sharing, she analyzes voter choice, conducting an empirical analysis that brings together institutional and behavioral data in a broad cross section of elections in democracies.

ISBN: 9780511657481 (ebook)Subjects--Topical Terms:

555341
Comparative government.

LC Class. No.: JF1001 / .K43 2009

Dewey Class. No.: 324.9

Voting for policy, not parties : = how voters compensate for power sharing /
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