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The Limits of Unlimited War : = American Victory Doctrine from Unconditional Surrender to Peace with Honor, 1943-1973.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The Limits of Unlimited War :/
Reminder of title:	American Victory Doctrine from Unconditional Surrender to Peace with Honor, 1943-1973.
Author:	Pace, Andrew O.
Description:	1 online resource (740 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-11, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International84-11A.
Subject:	American history. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798379527396

The Limits of Unlimited War : = American Victory Doctrine from Unconditional Surrender to Peace with Honor, 1943-1973.
Pace, Andrew O.

The Limits of Unlimited War :American Victory Doctrine from Unconditional Surrender to Peace with Honor, 1943-1973. - 1 online resource (740 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-11, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Colorado at Boulder, 2023.

Includes bibliographical references

My dissertation explains the remarkable reversal in U.S. foreign policy from victory at all costs in World War II to peace at any price in the Vietnam War. Between 1943 and 1973, the United States enacted an astonishing strategic and moral volte-face; from unconditional surrender to peace with honor, from unlimited war to limited war, and from an unwavering will to win against Germany and Japan to a desperate desire to escape Vietnam. Certainly, the shift from unconditional surrender and total victory in World War II to peace without conquest and peace with honor in Vietnam represented a change in American goals, while the turn from total or unlimited war to limited war signified a change in American strategies. But these changes were not merely evident alterations or evolutions of U.S. grand strategy and foreign policy, they indicated a less visible metamorphosis in American morality. Indeed, I argue that the decline of victory doctrine led the United States from victory at all costs to peace at any price. In World War II, victory had been the supreme moral and strategic consideration but, after Japan's unconditional surrender, U.S. strategists, commentators, and public opinion came to believe that total victory was immoral and impossible. As victory became less ethical - a shift called "debellicization" - and as minimizing casualties became more virtuous - a change I call "moral inflation" - Americans determined that victory was no longer worth the cost. The nuclear revolution thwarted America's annihilation strategy and made it impossible for the United States to win a war at acceptable cost while the nuclear taboo prevented presidents and their advisors from employing nuclear weapons. Limited wars also became unwinnable. Stalemate in Korea led U.S. strategists to negotiate an armistice, while the futility of guerrilla fighting in Indochina made them anxious to escape the Vietnam quagmire. Finally, U.S. strategists turned against killing and dying as their valuations of both American and enemy lives increased. Together, debellicization and moral inflation caused the United States to lose the disposition, determination, and willingness to pay the price of victory.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798379527396Subjects--Topical Terms:

1179188
American history.
Subjects--Index Terms:

DebellicizationIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

The Limits of Unlimited War : = American Victory Doctrine from Unconditional Surrender to Peace with Honor, 1943-1973.
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520 $a My dissertation explains the remarkable reversal in U.S. foreign policy from victory at all costs in World War II to peace at any price in the Vietnam War. Between 1943 and 1973, the United States enacted an astonishing strategic and moral volte-face; from unconditional surrender to peace with honor, from unlimited war to limited war, and from an unwavering will to win against Germany and Japan to a desperate desire to escape Vietnam. Certainly, the shift from unconditional surrender and total victory in World War II to peace without conquest and peace with honor in Vietnam represented a change in American goals, while the turn from total or unlimited war to limited war signified a change in American strategies. But these changes were not merely evident alterations or evolutions of U.S. grand strategy and foreign policy, they indicated a less visible metamorphosis in American morality. Indeed, I argue that the decline of victory doctrine led the United States from victory at all costs to peace at any price. In World War II, victory had been the supreme moral and strategic consideration but, after Japan's unconditional surrender, U.S. strategists, commentators, and public opinion came to believe that total victory was immoral and impossible. As victory became less ethical - a shift called "debellicization" - and as minimizing casualties became more virtuous - a change I call "moral inflation" - Americans determined that victory was no longer worth the cost. The nuclear revolution thwarted America's annihilation strategy and made it impossible for the United States to win a war at acceptable cost while the nuclear taboo prevented presidents and their advisors from employing nuclear weapons. Limited wars also became unwinnable. Stalemate in Korea led U.S. strategists to negotiate an armistice, while the futility of guerrilla fighting in Indochina made them anxious to escape the Vietnam quagmire. Finally, U.S. strategists turned against killing and dying as their valuations of both American and enemy lives increased. Together, debellicization and moral inflation caused the United States to lose the disposition, determination, and willingness to pay the price of victory.
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