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Deal or No Deal : = Explaining Congressional Restrictions on Arms Transfers.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Deal or No Deal :/
Reminder of title:	Explaining Congressional Restrictions on Arms Transfers.
Author:	Cohen, Jordan.
Description:	1 online resource (293 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-12, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International84-12A.
Subject:	Political science. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798379721404

Deal or No Deal : = Explaining Congressional Restrictions on Arms Transfers.
Cohen, Jordan.

Deal or No Deal :Explaining Congressional Restrictions on Arms Transfers. - 1 online resource (293 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-12, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--George Mason University, 2023.

Includes bibliographical references

Congress rarely legislates against the president's ability to sell weapons as a tool of foreign policy. As a result, scholars have paid inadequate attention to under what conditions Congress finds it valuable to legislate against the president's ability to weapons sales as a tool of foreign policy and why they even try. This dissertation proposes Congressional Arms Restraint Theory and argues that members of Congress are most likely to restrict the president's ability to use arms transfers as a tool of foreign policy when an arms sales scandal makes weapons transfers salient, Congress sees electoral benefits to legislating, and there is divided government.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798379721404Subjects--Topical Terms:

558774
Political science.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Arms saleIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Deal or No Deal : = Explaining Congressional Restrictions on Arms Transfers.
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245 1 0 $a Deal or No Deal : $b Explaining Congressional Restrictions on Arms Transfers.
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500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-12, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Hunzeker, Michael A.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--George Mason University, 2023.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a Congress rarely legislates against the president's ability to sell weapons as a tool of foreign policy. As a result, scholars have paid inadequate attention to under what conditions Congress finds it valuable to legislate against the president's ability to weapons sales as a tool of foreign policy and why they even try. This dissertation proposes Congressional Arms Restraint Theory and argues that members of Congress are most likely to restrict the president's ability to use arms transfers as a tool of foreign policy when an arms sales scandal makes weapons transfers salient, Congress sees electoral benefits to legislating, and there is divided government.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2024
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Political science. $3 558774
650 4 $a Public administration. $3 562473
653 $a Arms sale
653 $a Arms transfer
653 $a Congress
653 $a Foreign policy
653 $a Scandal
653 $a Weapons
653 $a President's ability
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