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Why Some Authoritarian Regimes Do Not Just Win Elections but Win Big : = Lessons from Cambodia and Malaysia.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Why Some Authoritarian Regimes Do Not Just Win Elections but Win Big :/
Reminder of title:	Lessons from Cambodia and Malaysia.
Author:	Ong, Limeng.
Description:	1 online resource (62 pages)
Notes:	Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 82-04.
Contained By:	Masters Abstracts International82-04.
Subject:	Political science. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798672186023

Why Some Authoritarian Regimes Do Not Just Win Elections but Win Big : = Lessons from Cambodia and Malaysia.
Ong, Limeng.

Why Some Authoritarian Regimes Do Not Just Win Elections but Win Big :Lessons from Cambodia and Malaysia. - 1 online resource (62 pages)

Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 82-04.

Thesis (M.A.)--Northern Illinois University, 2020.

Includes bibliographical references

Electoral authoritarian regimes have risen in the post-Cold War era. Elections and other nominally democratic institutions such political parties and legislatures not only do not make authoritarian regimes democratize but also help them to resist democratization. However, even if authoritarian regimes adopt electoral institutions, such adoption does not mean that all authoritarian regimes can easily manipulate elections. Indeed, some regimes hang on to power barely with simple majority votes, while others easily receive supermajority electoral support. What account for variation in electoral strength of ruling parties in authoritarian regimes? I attempt to answer this question. There are four main factors theoretically attributed to the electoral strength of authoritarian regimes: regime cohesion, regime capacity, regime's economic legitimacy, and absence of societal mobilization. Using data from Varieties of Democracy and the World Bank, I find that regime cohesion significantly explains electoral strength of the ruling parties in authoritarian regimes, whereas regime capacity and economic legitimacy display no effect. Societal mobilization has mixed effects, with civil society having no significant effect but media independence having significant negative effects. The results are consistent when triangulated with in-depth case studies of electoral authoritarian regimes in Cambodia and Malaysia.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798672186023Subjects--Topical Terms:

558774
Political science.
Subjects--Index Terms:

CambodiaIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Why Some Authoritarian Regimes Do Not Just Win Elections but Win Big : = Lessons from Cambodia and Malaysia.
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500 $a Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 82-04.
500 $a Advisor: Un, Kheang;Kuehl, Colin.
502 $a Thesis (M.A.)--Northern Illinois University, 2020.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a Electoral authoritarian regimes have risen in the post-Cold War era. Elections and other nominally democratic institutions such political parties and legislatures not only do not make authoritarian regimes democratize but also help them to resist democratization. However, even if authoritarian regimes adopt electoral institutions, such adoption does not mean that all authoritarian regimes can easily manipulate elections. Indeed, some regimes hang on to power barely with simple majority votes, while others easily receive supermajority electoral support. What account for variation in electoral strength of ruling parties in authoritarian regimes? I attempt to answer this question. There are four main factors theoretically attributed to the electoral strength of authoritarian regimes: regime cohesion, regime capacity, regime's economic legitimacy, and absence of societal mobilization. Using data from Varieties of Democracy and the World Bank, I find that regime cohesion significantly explains electoral strength of the ruling parties in authoritarian regimes, whereas regime capacity and economic legitimacy display no effect. Societal mobilization has mixed effects, with civil society having no significant effect but media independence having significant negative effects. The results are consistent when triangulated with in-depth case studies of electoral authoritarian regimes in Cambodia and Malaysia.
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538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
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653 $a Malaysia
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